Daniel Pedersen

ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION
Post gets to the truth of the matter

The Bangkok Post
Bangkok

The aged Westerner’s corpse, peacefully dressed in a black suit and tie, emerged from the chiller. My colleague and I were shocked as we were at the morgue inquiring about Awa, a young Shan migrant mauled to death whilst feeding an elephant at a safari park in Chiang Mai.
Awa’s relatives had not come forth to claim his body as they were too scared of arrest as they were unregistered. The assistant explained to us that no death certificate could hence be provided to proceed with legal action; the body would not be cleaned as it would be “disposed of” after a religious ceremony; and Awa was just an illegal Burmese “alien” anyway.
I came to see Awa’s mauled corpse before we left the morgue that day also, and will never forget the bright red blood stains on a plain white hospital sheet.
Awa died for free back then in 2006, and as is usual with migrants in Thailand, he died in tragic silence. Such endings too frequently befall the most unfortunate of Thailand’s two million plus migrant workforce and will continue to do so unless something radically changes in the government’s poor management of migration.
After many years, I now more fully comprehend the symbolism of the contrast between those two corpses I saw that day also – the way in which migrants end up several rungs below everyone else on Thailand’s hierarchical social ladder.
For over 20 years now, the Thai economy has utilised low skilled labourers from neighbouring Cambodia, Laos and Burma to support its rapid economic growth. Migrants’ sweat, and too frequently their blood, assisted in building skyscrapers across the country.
Through inhaling poisonous chemicals and with an ever darkening of their skin, migrants contribute to intensive agricultural projects that litter the countryside. Cleaning homes and caring for sick and elderly relatives, migrant women provide an invaluable social service to Thai families, freeing up women to work in rewarding jobs, yet they are often abused in the confines of homes that they rarely can leave. Migrants’ contribution to the Thai economy has now been quantified beyond doubt, even by World Bank economists.
Thailand’s most senior policy makers insisted during most of these 20 years however that this “illegal” migrant labour force was temporary. Hence a piecemeal “regularisation” programme utilising yearly cabinet resolutions provided enough of a means to regulate their “illegal” stay to “legally” work in the country for one year, prior to deportation at a time of Thailand’s choosing. By failing to formally respond to workers visibly pouring across Thailand’s borders to meet low-skilled labour needs, officials allowed networks of smuggling, trafficking and labour brokers to be formed and finally become entrenched.
In reality, temporary migrant regularisation systems since 1988 ensured more than 2 million workers, over 80% from Burma, remained “illegal” and hence, so senior officials said, could “justly” be denied basic human rights. Rights denied to “registered” migrants include access to compensation, rehabilitation and even disability registration following work accidents, the right to marry, ride a motorbike, travel outside of a province of registration or even own property. Claims Thailand was systematically and unlawfully discriminating against these workers, who are legally allowed to work here, met with constant denials.
The victims of this piecemeal migration management are the hundreds of thousands of migrants who have now lived “temporarily” in Thailand for more than a century. Given most come to Thailand at a relatively young age, it was only natural many would find partners, have children and marry. The official response has been a public demonising of the harm caused to Thailand’s social fabric by pregnant migrant women and the burden on resources by stateless migrant children. Whilst frequent threats to begin deporting pregnant women have yet to bear fruit, and despite some limited positive developments, most migrant children remain unregistered and uneducated and a clear policy to deal with them remains absent.
Officials continue to insist irregular migration flows into Thailand are a severe national security threat also. Which begs the question of what “national security” means. Does it mean ensuring the continuance of corruption which remains pervasive in the way this informal labour force is managed, an undermining of the rule of law or the ability to ensure a work force of over 2 million contribute where needed to the country’s economic growth but continue to live in grossly exploitative situations? If so, then Thailand’s security remains strong.
But if “national security” encapsulates even a basic level of human security for migrants and requires a formalisation of migration systems which can benefit Thailand’s economy, its population, as well as employers and migrant’s equally, Thailand is seriously at risk.
Social tension between migrants and their Thai hosts in the villages across the country seems to be increasing as Thais understand little who migrants are, why they are here and why their communities have, in their view, literally been taken over. This was seen most clearly when Ranong’s residents recently came out to protest that migrants passing the nationality verification process should not be allowed to apply for motorbike licences. Most media wields its power with gross irresponsibility and deep prejudice to publicly demonise migrants in support of the official line that these workers are an unwanted burden on the country. Suggesting migrants are a burden rather than a benefit for Thailand doesn’t ring true, however, once deep prejudice is shifted aside. Services registered migrants pay for are under-used, social welfare is denied to this group and the government has few policies to improve migrant’s quality of life.
Arguing migrant salaries are higher here than in their home countries and that they are lucky to be allowed to stay in Thailand, given their illegal entry, should not be used to silence criticism of a disrespect of basic human rights principles so as to consolidate power over a cheap, competitive and easily exploitable low-skilled migrant workforce. Suggesting migrants are stealing Thai workers’ jobs is to place the blame in the wrong place too, as employers act as the pull factor for migration into the country. An ongoing failure to modernise work methods to increase productivity and instead a reliance on a cheap migrant labour force which the country itself cannot produce may well soon contribute to Thailand’s decreased global competitiveness. The next 20 years will not be the same as the last in terms of global economics, so the government’s migration policy should perhaps seek to adapt. Thailand will soon no longer be able to compete with other regional countries on low cost production. Global consumers are now more concerned about ethnical work practices and less likely to purchase products produced through exploitation. Some seek to give the government credit for its strategy, planned since 1999 but only recently begun to be implemented, to formalise the “irregular” migration landscape of the country in three stages. First, verify the nationality of all “illegal” migrants in Thailand and issue them with temporary passports so they can become “legal” through the nationality verification (NV) process. Second, bring in fresh “legal” labour to meet strictly quantifiable labour shortages through formal government to government agreements. And third, register “illegal” migrants currently in the country to “legally” work temporarily only until these latter two principle aims can be achieved. But it seems the embedded and negative forces from two decades of informal migration management continue to be too strong for this formalisation strategy to ever succeed.
Since 2002 when the formal labour import channels were first agreed on, only around 25,000 workers have legally been brought into Thailand (that averages out at around 3, 000 per year). The NV process continues to be a non-transparent and expensive mess. Around a million of the estimated 2 million plus migrants in Thailand formally entered the process by a Feb 28, 2010 deadline that was backed up with the coercive threat of mass deportations if they didn’t comply. This coercive style of working, particularly its effect on Burma’s ethnic minorities working here, was condemned by the UN.
With around a million workers having until Feb 28, 2012 to complete NV, if the “verification” of biographical information sent to migrants’ home countries is genuine, the government will soon realise a significant number of migrants, particularly those from Burma’s ethnic minorities, inserted false information into the process to get work permit extensions for another 2 years. This was out of fear and confusion because of neglect on behalf of the Ministry of Labour to raise public awareness on what NV was about amongst the workers and their employers before setting down unrealistic deadlines.
Clearly symbolic of Thailand’s treatment of migrants is broker exploitation. Both as part of NV and the new import system, the complexity of both processes mean a broker is a necessity. If Thailand was really genuine about solving its irregular migration challenges, the costs involved in using these brokers would be reduced to provide incentives for migrants and employers to comply. Instead, broker systems remain unregulated in practice, despite some informal caps announced by the Ministry of Labour, and costs remain extortionately high both for employers and workers. Rumours abound regarding who is behind these companies. Huge profits being reaped by brokers are usually passed on to migrants themselves, and for workers earning so little already, that creates a grossly unfair situation where debt bondage results.
On June 2, 2010 Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva entered into the migration debate by signing an order to set up a “special centre to suppress, arrest and prosecute alien workers who are working underground”. The crackdown that followed this was stated to be an essential part of the government’s strategy to formally manage migration by arresting and deporting migrants who refused to enter the NV process to allow them to be imported back to Thailand legally. What resulted however was a well documented “arrest and extort” policy of the police and related officials affecting both unregistered and registered workers. International media began to expose a lack of formal deportation practices with transfers of Burmese migrants into a revolving and vicious cycle of extortion and trafficking involving brokers, officials and ethnic militias in Mae Sot/Myawaddy and at Ranong/Kawthaung.
Amidst the deputy prime minister’s public announcement of an intensifying unregistered migrant crackdown, and despite the government’s insistence there would never be another opportunity for those unregistered migrants in the country to register without returning home and entering again legally, plans for a new registration process for unregistered migrants has just been announced in a policy U-turn due to low skilled labour shortages. Whilst welcome, the wheel of poor migration management spins full circle again.
Systematic discrimination continues against migrants, prejudice abounds and social tension rises. Corruption goes untackled and brokers become stronger. Migrants continue to suffer gross exploitation by employers, systematic extortion by government officials (particularly by police and others who are supposed to protect them), and now a heavy burden from the costs of formalisation processes that, when weighed up, rarely seem to benefit them. Such was the recent experience of thousandsof striking migrants in Khon Kaen who, after completing NV and still getting few rights, decided enough was enough.
Senior officials are saying more often these days that the time has arrived to solve this migration mess in more rational ways, considering human rights alongside national security and economic need. A parliamentary labour committee has drafted a new migrant law, and Mr Abhisit keeps saying this year’s census will reveal how many migrants are really in Thailand to provide data to support more considered migration policies in the future. Evidence suggests census teams are having a hard time finding the migrants, however, as employers continue to keep them well covered up.
More than 20 years of irregular migration have passed now. Considering how many migrants have faced the same fate as Awa, unequal even in death, is not a pleasant thought. Migrants remain silent and unorganised in the face of all this exploitation with just a handful of positive examples of their fighting for and accessing justice, despite hundreds of NGOs seeking to assist. The outlook for Thailand’s low skilled migrants remains bleak unless the government urgently moves to prioritise the improving of their lot.
Maybe then the time has come for morality to be discussed when considering Thailand’s management of migration. For most of these migrants come from Burma, the pariah of Asean and the symbol of all that is undemocratic in governance in the region. One can accept that the root cause of these irregular migration flows is not wholly Thailand’s responsibility, but the country is reaping huge benefits from a massive and easily exploitable Burmese workforce, so accepting this burden comes at a cost.
If Thailand continues to neglect these workers and reap the benefits without fulfilling the duty to treat them well, perhaps one can conclude that numerous administrations have been successful in manufacturing and then upholding a social zone of unlawfulness we see today in which migrants fall beyond basic protection mechanisms, the rule of law and are denied even the most basic human rights.
Thailand’s policies have for too long contributed to the immoral exploitation of these “temporary” workers. So perhaps the time has come for Thailand to receive a bit of the condemnation for gross human rights violations against the Burmese people which is usually reserved only for its dictatorial neighbour.

Andy Hall is currently a consultant to the Human Rights and Development Foundation and was director of HRDF’s Migrant Justice Programme from 2007 to 2010.

Mizzima

Bern Smith

Mae Sot

A makeshift camp near the Thai-Burmese border in Tha Song Yang district last year. Karen refugees lived in this camp for months, through the worst of the wet season. Photo: Mizzima

An exodus of refugees in numbers never before seen along the Thai-Burma border could begin within days, the KNU/KNLA Peace Council has warned.

In a plea to the “international community”, the Peace Council this week said 6,000 to 10,000 people could initially be evacuated, but if the Burma Army made a clean sweep of its capital, as many as 100,000 people could be affected.

The KNU/KNLA Peace Council signed an agreement with Burma’s ruling military junta, the State Peace and Development Council, in 2006 when it broke away from the Karen National Union.

Since then it has developed a capital on the western side of the Dawna mountain range, at Hto Kaw Ko, and its leaders have entered into business arrangements with the Burma Army.

Peace Council leaders have been consistently accused of switching sides merely to enrich themselves.

Earlier this year the SPDC demanded ethnic groups transform themselves into Border Guard Forces, taking orders directly from the Burma Army.

The KNU/KNLA Peace Council has repeatedly refused to become an armed wing of the Burma Army and steadfastly refused to fight troops of the Karen National Liberation Army. But now the SPDC has demanded the Peace Council begin obeying orders or be declared an “unlawful or illegal organisation”.

KNLA Colonel Nerdah Mya

Burma Army Lt-Gen Ye Myint has met with Peace Council leaders and delivered an ultimatum: Join forces with us by Sunday or the population of Hto Kaw Ko will be displaced and your capital destroyed.

In a move that could be perceived as tactically unwise, Peace Council leaders say they dismissed the demand on the spot and began preparing to defend themselves.

The Peace Council is well armed – this correspondent has seen truckloads of brand new M-60s and M-16s and many thousands of rounds of ammunition in their possession.

A spokesman for the Peace Council said: “If the Burmese determine to breach and violate the peace agreement and initiate war, then the Karen will have no choice but to do everything in their power to defend [themselves].

“However [if the] safe area [Hto Kaw Ko] is no longer considered safe, the children and families may have to cross over the border into Thailand.

“Acceptance by the Thais is not certain,” the spokesman said.

Elements of the KNLA last night declared that they would flank KNU/KNLA Peace Council units if they were forced to evacuate to the Thai-Burma border.

KNLA Colonel Nerdah Mya, eldest son of the late KNLA General Bo Mya, said: “We are all Karen and the people must be defended.”

He said his men would certainly help the Peace Council forces if they were attacked by the Burma Army and found themselves in danger of being overwhelmed.

Colonel Nerdah’s primary concern was for the civilian population, he said.

By all accounts it is unlikely the Thais will accept thousands of Peace Council refugees pouring over the border. While contingency plans have been made for three sites around Mae Sot – at Tha Son Yang, Phop Phra and Umphang – there are strict conditions for people seeking refuge in Thailand.

Anyone who comes across the border must be directly fleeing fighting and no combatants of any side, or their families, will be given food or shelter.

The Thai Third Army, which controls an area from Kanchanaburi in the south to Mae Hong Son in the far north, maintains the dispute between the SPDC and the Peace Council is an “internal affair”, one for the Burmese to sort out amongst themselves.

While NGO workers along the border are treating the situation developing between the Peace Council and the Burma Army as a serious matter, they remain sceptical that 100,000 people might flee Burma.

Faced with reduced capacity because international donors are becoming fatigued by more than six decades of fighting in Karen State, the organisations providing for refugees are hoping they are not inundated with tens of thousands of new arrivals from Burma.

But, should the Burma Army make a clean sweep from Hto Kaw Ko to the Thai-Burma border, the number of people fleeing could well dwarf last year’s exodus to Tha Son Yang.

Last year, during June and July, about 6,500 people ended up on the Thai side in Tha Son Yang district when the KNLA lost its Seventh Brigade region to the Burma Army-aligned militia, the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army.

What followed was a disaster, as people clustered in small groups along the border and NGOs scrambled to keep up with simple needs, such as sanitation, food and shelter.

ENDS

DVB

Francis Wade

  Bangkok, Thailand

July 16, 2010

The fallout from the global recession has combined with tightening economic sanctions on Burma to cause an apparent nosedive in foreign investment over the past year, Burmese government statistics show.

A report by the Ministry of National Planning and Development, seen by AP, shows that overseas investment fell 68 percent, or US$670 million, in the 2009-10 fiscal year. This is despite Burma sealing seven new investment deals in that period, four of which were in its lucrative oil and gas sector, AP said.

The Burmese economy is in a phase of wholesale reinvention, with the government selling off swathes of previously state-owned industry to private businesses. It is also busily attracting more foreign investment, largely from neighbouring China, India and Thailand. The majority is focused on its energy sector and extractive industries.

But while overseas investment figures may have fallen, the ruling junta is still waiting for the activation of a number of projects that will eventually net them billions of dollars. The Shwe dual-pipeline project, which will carry oil and gas from Burma’s western shores to southern China, is likely to generate some US$30 billion over the three decades after it comes online in 2012.

Moreover, much of the revenue from these projects is believed to be stashed in foreign banks, mainly Singaporean, and will therefore not show up in government figures, which are commonly believed to be tweaked to avoid close scrutiny of its economic practices. Poor economic indicators also provide ammunition for the junta in its claims that sanctions are hurting Burmese people.

Burma remains one of the world’s least developed countries, despite the swift rise of many of its regional neighbours. Last year it ranked 138 out of 182 countries on the UN’s Human Development Index, while the UN Development Programme said last month that Burma would struggle to meet any of the Millennium Development Goals by 2015.

Given the crutch that burgeoning trade with China in particular has given, much of the Western community is now questioning the worth of sanctions, first implemented by the US in 1997. The boycott had intended to force the regime on a path toward democratic transition, but Burma is now heading towards elections this year that appear set to entrench military rule.

The economic powerhouses of the Asia-Pacific region – notably China, Thailand and Singapore – have refused to join the US and EU in implementing sanctions, while trade with Burma’s giant to the west, India, is gaining in momentum. Burma supplies some 80 percent of Thailand’s gas, while for strategic reasons China is keen to secure the deposits and ports of the Bay of Bengal for its energy needs.

An Economist Intelligence Unit report this month said that economic growth in Burma will accelerate next year, but if one were to discount the expansion of the gas and hydropower industries, the economy will remain weak and growth “sluggish”.

DVB

ENDS

The Nation

Nalin Viboonchart

  Bangkok, Thailand

July 16, 2010

Investors from many Thai sectors are looking to Burma, with its low operating costs, abundant natural resources and large market, according to the Thai-Myanmar Business Council.

Representatives of Burma’s private sector visited the council in recent weeks to lobby Thai industries to establish manufacturing plants in the country, whose official name is Myanmar, said Thai-Myanmar Business Council Santi Vilassakdanont. Promising sectors in Burma include food processing, agriculture-related industries, consumer products and garments, he said.

Burma will hold a general election at the end of this year. It is expected that the new Burmese government will establish investment incentives aimed at foreign businesses.

“Burma has been opening its country to foreign investment since member nations agreed to implement the Asean Economic Community by 2015. Asean will become a single market under this agreement, and Burma does not want to be left behind. We’re cooperating closely with the private sector in Burma,” Santi said.

Moreover, Burmese authorities want to create jobs. At present, many Burmese labourers work in Thai manufacturing plants on the countries’ border. It makes sense for the Burmese to encourage these people to work in their home country, he said.

The Thai-Myanmar Business Council plans to take a delegation, including about 20 Thai businesspeople, to Burma next month, Santi said. During the visit, the two countries will sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) securing the supply of certain Burmese agricultural products to the Thai food-processing industry, as well as garment exports from Thailand to Burma.

Thai manufacturers will also be given opportunities to meet and establish relationships with Burmese businesspeople.

Santi said he had also received expressions of interest from representatives of firms in such heavy-industry sectors such as steel and cement, as well as from the energy industry, about investing in Burma.

Other countries, including China and Singapore, are also looking for investment opportunities in Burma. Santi said Thailand needs to take advantage of its geographical proximity to Burma and its historical ties with the country’s people.

“Thai industries should pay more attention to investing in Burma as the operating costs in that country, such as labour and land costs, are lower than in Thailand. Besides, the investment regulations in Burma are less stringent than in our country right now. We don’t know yet when the Southern Seaboard project will be ready for new investment,” he said.

The Thai-Myanmar Business Council was set up in February this year as collaboration between the Federation of Thai Industries (FTI), the Thai Chamber of Commerce and the Thai Bankers Association. Santi, who is a former chairman of the FTI, is the first chairman of the council.

The Nation

ENDS

So who are the republicans waiting in the wings?

Don Talenywun

  Bangkok, Thailand

May 25, 2010

The stickers label him "pramook (president)" of the "new Thai state".

Everyone denied responsibility for the red and white stickers plastered around Bangkok during the melee these past weeks.

Spooked Bangkok residents first spotted the garish stickers well before the killing started in central Bangkok.

The stickers carried the message: “New Thai State under President Thaksin Shinawatra.”

Thaksin immediately denied he had anything to do with the stickers or the message they bore, and the red shirts said they didn’t know where they had come from.

But the stickers were there, on walls, trumpeting the proposition of Thailand becoming a republic with Thaksin as head of state, or president.

The red shirt campaign has been painted as Thailand’s have-nots challenging the rich elite.

Many protestors may well have mustered to fight for democracy and the chance of a fairer go, embracing the leaders’ propaganda, but the appearance of the stickers would suggest a broader campaign, perhaps still in its infancy, to re-write Thailand’s constitution.

The stickers were placed to seed a thought, perhaps gauge public opinion.

It is both alleged and denied that Thaksin and a group of peers, many of whom were to become founding members of the now-disbarred Thai Rak Thai (Thai Love Thai) Party, met in Finland in 1999 to hatch a plan to instrument major changes to how Thailand is governed.

They are said to have laid down plans to change Thailand forever, off-loading its form of constitutional democracy.

The meeting would constitute prima facie treason on behalf of all those who attended.

Should such a bid to transform Thailand’s constitutional status to that of a republic succeed, the revered Royal family’s assets, its holding companies and their largely tax-free existence could face a shakedown.

The Crown Property Bureau controls a formidable portfolio of properties that help to make the King Thailand’s richest man.

The CPB owns land that includes some of Bangkok’s best real estate.

Its tenants include Siam Paragon, Central World and MBK.

Central World was coincidentally one of the buildings destroyed by arsonists as the red shirt protestors abandoned their central Bangkok compound on Wednesday, May 19.

Since 1932, when Thailand transformed from an absolute monarchy to the constitutional democracy it is today, the former Kingdom of Siam can only have been considered a tin-pot democracy at best, a flat-out military dictatorship at worst.

With eight military coups since 1932 and another three attempted coups thrown in, repeated collapse of government and an array of snap elections, Thai democracy has proven itself dynamic if nothing else.

Yet Thailand’s monarchy, while officially removed from decision-making processes, is still the sounding board of coup-makers and governments in crisis alike.

Unconditionally adored by the masses, King Rama IX is the world’s longest-serving,living monarch.

But the same cannot be said of his son, Crown Prince Maha Vajiralongkorn, whose reputation as a ladies’ man and a bit of a wheeler-dealer precedes him.

It was suggestions of burgeoning business links between the Crown Prince and then Prime Minister Thaksin in a short article in the Far Eastern Economic Review in 2002 that led to two journalists’ visas being suspended.

Shawn Crispin and Rodney Tasker were told to prepare for deportation in late February 2002.

On the government’s behalf, the episode appeared to be a poorly-executed attempt to subdue foreign correspondents residing in Thailand.

They were threatened with charges of lese majeste and described as a threat to national security.

This uncharacteristic lack of finesse on the Thais’ behalf appeared to be a blatant and apparently quite-hurried attempt to quash the matter, shoot the messenger and declare the subject of the article illegal in the Kingdom.

And the Thai authorities threatened two correspondents from a prestigious magazine with deportation to show they meant business.

ENDS

STRATFOR

  Bangkok, Thailand

May 19, 2010

In a success for Thailand’s armed forces, the military offensive against Red Shirt protesters in central Bangkok ended May 19.

The opposition Red Shirts now find themselves in a weakened position, but even so, they are not likely to fade away completely.

With the end of the offensive, the ruling Democrat Party now has bought itself some time to deal with the remaining challenges it faces ahead of elections that must be called no later than December 2011.

For its part, the Thai army has emerged in a much stronger position.

Analysis

Thai troops ended their offensive in downtown Bangkok at the main rally site of the United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship or “Red Shirt” protesters May 19. At 1pm local time, Red Shirt leaders in police custody asked their followers to go home. The operation concluded at 2 pm local time, with a total of about five dead and 50 wounded for the day.

Bangkok and 23 provinces in the north and northeast will be under curfew all night as police and the military attempt to put out fires, prevent follow-on attacks and stop sporadic small riots and any lingering protesters.

Most of the 3,000 or so protesters who remained until the very end will be taken to a stadium, loaded on buses and sent back to those north and northeastern provinces from where most of them came.

The army appears to have executed the final operation successfully. Some had feared the operation might last all of May 19 and even push into the next day. And the death toll was remarkably small compared to the nearly 40 who died in fighting from May 13-17 and the 26 or so who died in April 10 clashes.

That said, the bloodshed in recent months has exceeded that of periods of comparable unrest in the country in 1976 and 1992.

The low body count on May 19 is partially a result of the army’s ability to avoid pushing forces directly into the main protest; instead, it managed to shut down the protest by encircling it.

Only limited Red Shirt protests or violence occurred outside of Bangkok on May 19. In one instance of violence, some 5,000 protesters stormed the town hall in Udon Thani in reaction to the crackdown and calls for a general uprising. The crowd threatened to set fire to the building with car tires and fuel.

Elsewhere, 1,000 protesters broke through the main gate of the town hall in Khon Kaen. Neither of these events escalated into major conflict with security, however.

both locations are part of the Red Shirt movement’s northeastern support base, persistent attacks against public buildings and incidents of arson bear close scrutiny, as they might erupt into a greater conflagration.

The Red Shirt movement is now in very bad shape. Four of its top leaders were arrested May 19, and many of their deputies are also likely now (or soon will be) in custody. The arrestees, as well as a handful of powerful people behind the scenes, face vigorous prosecution and could face terrorism charges, which can carry capital punishment.

Other Red Shirts fled the scene before the final showdown, while military snipers assassinated the most radical Red Shirt, Maj. Gen. Khattiya Sawasdipol, aka Seh Daeng, when the final anti-protest operation began.

More than 100 bank accounts have been frozen to prevent the flow of funds from exiled politicians to their Red Shirt proxies.

Parties affected by these moves go beyond Thaksin Shinawatra, the exiled former prime minister and inspiration behind the Red Shirts, who saw a large chunk of his remaining funds in Thai banks seized in late February (one proximate cause of the mass protests).

Nevertheless, the Red Shirt movement will eventually regroup, though perhaps under a different banner.

The movement is grounded in the wide disparity of wealth, power and status between Thailand’s northern and northeastern provinces and Bangkok.

percent of Thailand’s nearly 70 million population lives in Bangkok, while about one-third lives in the northeast.

movement thus will continue to enjoy an advantage in numbers and voters and will continue to clamor for a more representative government. Such political change would threaten the interests of members of the royal family and bureaucratic and military elites in Bangkok. The contest will continue to play out as elite factions opposed to the status quo harness the popular movement for their own gain.

The Red Shirts’ push to force new elections, which began in mid-March, has failed. Because the Reds did not agree with an earlier proposal to end protests in exchange for elections in November, the ruling Democrat Party does not need to call elections until December 2011.

This gives the ruling party time to work on keeping its coalition together, dismantle the Red Shirt movement, pursue its political enemies, consolidate power, finalize its budget with the necessary perks for its allies and defend itself against the acrimonious aftermath in parliament and against public charges of mishandling the affair — all of which it must accomplish if it is to survive.

One example of the hurdles it faces is the case under consideration by the Electoral Commission over whether to dissolve the Democrat Party due to corruption. If it loses the case, the party would have to re-form under a different name to stay in power.

For its part, the Thai army has greatly strengthened its position.

First, it has shut down the protests forcefully in the past week, reclaiming some of the prestige it lost after a bungled attempt to end protests April 10.

More important, with its preferred civilian leaders in place, the army can expect a smooth transition of leadership in October, when Gen. Prayuth Chan Ocha is expected to succeed current army chief Gen. Anupong Paochinda. Prayuth is seen as a staunch royalist and the head of the leading military faction, as opposed to the military faction sympathetic to the Red Shirts and to Thaksin.

Throughout the recent mayhem, and especially since mid-April, the military has taken a leading role in overseeing the security response to the protests — in great part accounting for the high levels of bloodshed.

This informal power will not be as conspicuous now that the protests have concluded, but the military is not eager to cede any influence it has gained.

In general, its influence in the Thai establishment is strengthening as other important institutions — namely the monarchy and Privy Council — are undergoing generational transitions.

To deflect any criticism that could undermine its newly strengthened position, the army can point to civilian leaders’ handling of the crisis.

Ultimately the conclusion of the latest bout of mass protests has reaffirmed the cycle of instability that is inseparable from Thailand’s geographical, social, political and economic conditions.

This cycle is accelerating and intensifying as King Bhumibol Adulyadej nears the end of his life and a half-century long reign, creating deep uncertainty and competition among powerful interests and institutions.

Thailand’s cyclical political troubles, and its frequent periods of rising military control, have not prevented it from achieving economic success over the past half century, and its deeply divided political forces have managed to find accommodation within its well-established governmental structures before.

But the death of the king threatens to weaken the country’s ideological cohesion in a way that has not happened since 1946, when his reign began, and therefore the trend toward greater political turbulence is set to increase over the coming years, at least until the transition takes place and a new power arrangement emerges.

This report is republished with the permission of STRATFOR: www.STRATFOR.com.

ENDS

Flood of people expected as Burma’s military junta prepares for elections this year

Mizzima

Dan Pedersen

  Mae Sot, Thailand

May 5, 2010

The Thai Army has established “protection” areas close to the Burmese border near Mae Sot, anticipating a flood of refugees as Burma’s ruling military junta prepares for elections this year.

As many as 10,000 Burmese are soon expected to be driven across the Thai border by troops of the State Peace and Development Council.

As the ethnic minority armies reject the junta’s demands they declare themselves Border Guard Forces, thereby transforming into government-led militias, the fighting and the fleeing begins.

Already Mon State residents are clustering on the Burmese side of the border, having made it across Karen State to the Thai border.

For the time they are holed up in an internally-displaced persons camp known as Halockhani.

The Thai Army has been monitoring a major military build-up on the Burmese side and has interpreted it as a massing of troops for a major offensive.

So convinced are the Thais of the coming offensive that two areas have been selected to shelter people displaced by the fighting, one to Mae Sot’s north, the other to the south.

The area in the south, Walay, near Phop Phra, is opposite a former KNLA base, Wah Lay Kee (see article), lost to the DKBA last year.

The other is at Kokko (see article and video), the district slated for a new bridge across the Moei River between Burma and Thailand.

Walay backs onto the KNLA’s Sixth Brigade region, Kokko is opposite KNLA Seventh Brigade.

This time, the Thai Army has made it clear there will be no permanent structures established to shelter people and those fleeing fighting will be expected to return home.

Lessons have been learned from last year’s DKBA offensive to Mae Sot’s north, when thousands of people landed on the Thai side in nebulous clusters spread across hundreds of kilometers.

As many as 6,000 people landed in Thailand in a short period of time and several significant KNLA base camps were lost to the DKBA.

At that time – in June, July and August – Thai authorities initially agreed with NGOs operating out of Mae Sot that an entirely new camp might have to be built because of the huge numbers of people fleeing fighting.

But while a few potential sites were surveyed, a new camp was never allowed, because of security threats posed by either DKBA or SPDC troops.

The new rules put in place by the Thais will certainly eliminate any attraction to the temporary camps.

No water tanks or new toilets will be allowed.

And people fleeing fighting more than 100 kilometres from the border will not be allowed to cross into Thailand.

Access to the two refuge zones will be extremely limited, with Thai soldiers having the final say about who may cross the border for temporary security.

Anyone thought to have links to the KNU or the DKBA will not be allowed to cross.

And no new arrivals will be permitted access to the existing refugee camps in Thailand.

ENDS

Junta details how to assault ethnic minorities, decimate development of Christian church

www.danielpedersen.org

Daniel Pedersen

  Mae Sariang, Thailand

November 28, 2009

Leaked documents from Burma’s ruling military junta provide shocking insight of the inner workings of a fascist regime bent on eliminating diversity within its own people.

The documents are detailed directives about how to assault ethnic minorities and decimate development of the Christian church in Burma.

Two telling documents have been acquired by ethnic minority organisations, one detailing payment incentives for impregnating ethnic minority women so as to dilute their bloodlines, the other how best to purge Christianity from Burmese society.

Both documents refer to the Burmese “master race” and relate a desperate desire to maintain Burman domination over myriad ethnic minorities who populate much of Burma’s landmass.

The brochure claims the State Peace and Development Council, Burma’s ruling military clique, has set a budget of five million pounds sterling (GBP) annually to fund “Human on Human conquest”.

Monthly incentives being offered to members of the Burman majority are staggered from 500 kyat ($A84 at the official rate) for impregnating a “commoner or ordinary woman” to 2,700 kyat to the “daughter or niece of an educated, wealthy person”.

At the unofficial or black market rate by which everyone in Burma operates – about 1,000 kyat to the US dollar – making a “commoner” pregnant would attract a payment of little more than 50 Australian cents a month.

Currently in Burma rice is retailing for about 1,000 kyat per 2.5kg, enough staple for a person on an extremely lean diet to eat for five days.

Rice prices soar

The Burman majority is thought to constitute about 60 per cent of Burma’s population, the sum of the rest divided among a swathe of ethnic minorities, the two most-populous being Karen and Shan, each thought to make up about seven per cent of the population.

The brochure being distributed in ethnic minority areas is headed “A notice urging Burmese comrades to act” and suggests “Burmese comrades shall assault other ethnic groups of Burma by all possible means; both economic and social”.

It says the main objective of the assault is the “everlasting dominance of the Burman race”.

And it says the easiest way to achieve this is “subjugating non-Burman women through inter-racial breeding”.

It spells out measures that can be employed by Burman men loyal to their “comrades”.

“Typically, ethnic women lack moral principles, and tend to like and envy Burman men. In order to attract ethnic women into Burman society we should exploit these characteristics,” the brochure says.

“Ultimately non-Burman women shall effectively become prostitutes if offered money in an affectionate manner by Burman men,” it says.

“Dear comrades, if we are unable to carry out the above, ethnic people will become a poisonous substance that will harm the Burman race,” says the brochure.

“Oh my dear comrades, there is no time greater than the present to proceed with the above, we shall therefore work to subjugate non-Burman women by offering financial disbursement to encourage sexual relationships.”

It then goes on to list prices for impregnating women of various social levels.

It also deals with the possibility of a forced withdrawal from the ethnic areas in the future and the “benefits” of such a breeding programme in the long-term.

“We must entrench ourselves as firmly as we can in every corner … In case we have to leave the ethnic regions permanently one day, we shall leave our bloodline established,” the brochure says.

It closes with instructions to distribute the brochure – its fourth edition – only to Burmans who can be trusted to keep the matter confidential.

The documents relating to “eradication of Christianity” have supposedly been issued by the “Religious Order of Highest Honored Monks” and are marked “top secret”.

They constitute guidelines issued by a special unit supposedly established by monks to deal with Christianity – it is referred to as the “Cleansing Association”.

Given the Burmese Sangha’s (the monks’ supreme body) current hostility to the junta it seems highly unlikely they would pen such a document, particularly one that flies in the face of Buddhism’s ideals.

Under a heading “annihilate”, its first recommendation is to oppose the development of Christianity and every Christian household.

The Burmese documents suggest multi-faceted discrimination against Christians will be used as an offensive tactic to scupper the religion’s growth.

It also recommends “all means necessary” to defeat the rise of Christianity, “be they violent or peaceful means”.

The documents also suggest attacking the concept of creation with “scientific” theory and exposing what are considered inherent weaknesses of Christianity, such as its “gentleness and politeness”.

It portrays Christianity as narrow-minded, as opposed to Buddhism, which it claims is free of all prejudice.

It also suggested the “indecent apparel of morally bereft Christian youth” could be exposed among laypeople to Buddhism’s advantage.

These violent discriminatory tactics have been well known by ethnic minorities for years now – they have been subjected to racial and religious attacks for decades.

But the acquisition of these documents points to a determined campaign by the military junta to oppress, or even eventually eradicate, ethnic minorities, particularly those who have embraced Christianity.

The Karen have largely adopted Christianity, having always believed in a single god and a single book of his commandments.

Such was their dedication to these beliefs that upon “discovery” by American Baptist missionaries in the mid 1800s it was speculated they might have been a lost tribe of Israel.

From “tribe” to “state”: An official view of Karen identity

New editions of these documents do not augur well for recognition of ethnic minorities’ rights in next year’s planned elections, nor do they bode well for countries that believe the junta’s attitudes can be changed via “engagement”.

These tactics are anything but new.

In 2001 I interviewed a 19-year-old defector from Burma’s Army, Htun Htun, and he recounted religiously inspired attacks on villages.

“We walked into Ka La Ner, a Muslim village.

“First we burned the mosque then told everyone to leave for three days.

“We then began forcibly relocating anyone who refused to leave and seized control of the village and 25 others surrounding it,” he said.

Htun Htun said when the SPDC troops had finished using the village as a base they burned it down, wiping out more than 100 families’ homes.

Or take the case of Ye Ye Aye, whom I interviewed in December 2000 just days after she had arrived at Mae Lae refugee camp, to Mae Sot’s north.

She said in August 2000, soldiers of the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army, a militia allied with the SPDC, marched into her home village of Aong Daw.

She said they immediately began terrorising people and grouping at gunpoint those who admitted to being Christian.

They were then marched out of town, never to be seen again.

Ye Ye Aye was at the time 25 years old, is a Christian and a mother of three.

She, like others from her home village all those years ago, lied about being Christian and used to pray only when she knew she would not be discovered.

The soldiers who took control of the village were strict vegetarian Buddhists, she said, and each night searched every house for any evidence of meat or eggs.

Anyone found with such “contraband” was jailed in a bamboo compound.

Ye Ye Aye fled her home village in a moment of opportunity with her husband, 32-year-old Hla Kah Paw and her three children on December 12, 2000.

She still lives in Thailand’s Mae La refugee camp and thanks God that she and her family survived.

ENDS

www.danielpedersen.org

Don Talenywun

  Mae Sot, Thailand

October 14, 2009

Unauthorised meetings with Burma’s ruling junta, the State Peace and development Council, in Rangoon and Naypidaw last year ensured Nay Soe Mya’s ouster from his father’s beloved Karen National Union and Karen National Liberation Army.

The KNU now regards him as a traitor and people who once thought of themselves as comrades-in-arms want nothing to do with him.

Better known as Tay Lay, the late General Bo Mya’s youngest son crossed into Thailand this month, driving a car with Thai registration plates, carrying a Thai passport and doing the rounds of his old stomping ground of Mae Sot, a town where whispers were exchanged in his wake.

He’s still got the same disarming grin and remains loose with the facts.

He’s stacked on weight around the gut, but sticks with his tight, black T-shirts that make clear he shares the broad shoulders of his famous father, the late General Bo Mya.

Tay Lay Mya likes to wear dark glasses, slip-on dress shoes, a nice cut of trouser and considers himself quite the ladies’ man.

Once a prominent figure in Karen circles, Tay Lay has now aligned himself with his uncle, former KNLA Brigadier-General Htein Maung.

Htein Maung was once KNLA Seventh Brigade commander, but absconded in 2006 amid allegations of multi-million baht theft.

Tay Lay has now joined Htein Maung’s ranks.

He brags about having taken 42 soldiers from KNLA Seventh Brigade’s 202 Battalion with him when he jumped ship to work with Naypidaw.

He’s a little more reserved when he admits he only got four from Sixth Brigade’s 201 Battalion, the hardcore crew that held onto the stronghold of Wah Lay Kee for months either side of the new year in the face of constant attacks.

“The Peace Council has a problem with the SPDC,” he says matter-of-factly, as he pulls up a plastic seat and orders a glass of milk at a Mae Sot cafe.

“Two months ago they [the SPDC] asked Htein Maung to fight the KNU.

“We have said we will not fight the KNU.

“We have been asked to change badges for an SPDC insignia, some DKBA [the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army, a KNU splinter group allied with the SPDC] commanders have agreed, some have not. We have not.

“Some of the leaders have said it would be considered a move against the Karen people,” he said.

Tay Lay said the current pressure from the SPDC for militia armies to “join the legal fold” and transform into “Border Guard Forces” backed by the SPDC was not working for the greater Karen community.

“The SPDC will order the border guard forces to fight the KNU,” he said.

The entity to which he is now aligned, the ambiguously-named KNU/KNLA Peace Council, has refused to fight the KNU and will not transform itself into a border guard force if that is a pre-requisite.

“But Htein Maung [the supreme KNU/KNLA Peace Council leader] has said we must control the borderline,” said Tay Lay.

Control of border territory relates directly to the Peace Council’s interest in trade with Thailand.

It seems this is not an area where conflict with the KNLA is likely anyway.

KNLA Special Warfare Branch chief, Brigadier-General Saw Hsar Gay, earlier this month said border fighting was not on the KLNA’s agenda, regarding it as an expensive waste of ammunition.

The KNLA’s intention is to move deeper inside Burma, he said.

So it would seem the Peace Council and the DKBA will have the border to themselves – and have to sort out who takes what cut on which deal, a potentially messy business.

Peace Council members are widely regarded within the KNU as money-grabbing opportunists.

And the SPDC has reinforced this view, rewarding their desertion with revenues from Thai-Burma border trade, showering them with “gifts” and essentially giving them their own carriage on the junta’s gravy train.

“We are close to the SPDC, but don’t agree with everything they say,” Tay Lay said of the Peace Council.

He, for one, has done well out of his shift from the KNU.

He shows me snapshots of his three new homes in Burma and says he now owns 12 vehicles, one a jeep with an M-60 machine-gun mounted on top.

For the record, the American-designed M-60 is capable of firing 550 7.62mm rounds per minute.

But, according to its own leaders, the Peace Council is not in conflict with anyone.

Tay Lay says he is now in the jade business, teaming up with SPDC vice chairman Maung Aye’s sister-in-law, selling jade internationally.

“We’re working together, she came to me and asked how she could help,” he said.

Tay Lay carries two passports, Thai and Burmese, and has homes at To Kau Ko, Myawaddy and Rangoon, but says he doesn’t live in Rangoon because he’s not really sure how the SPDC feels about him and worries they may assassinate him.

Much of Tay Lay’s cash comes from the Myawaddy-Mae Sot and Shwe Kokko-Kokko tax gates.

“We’re also planning a new road to To Kaw Ko,” he said, and quickly sketched a map showing To Kaw Ko directly west of Mae La refugee camp, across the dividing Dawna Mountain Range.

The sketch showed a rough square, bordered by Myadwaddy on the Moei, Kaw Ka Klae to the west, To Kaw Ko to the north and Mae Lae in the east.

This is apparently Tay Lay’s patch.

He said he personally commanded 1,800 men, the Peace Council’s Company One, which he described as a “special company”, comprising Battalions 709, 708, 37 and 777.

This flies in the face of KNLA Colonel Nerdah Mya’s (Tay Lay’s older brother) estimates of the Peace Council’s strength.

“They have about 300 men,” he said earlier this year.

Tay Lay said the major difference between the Peace Council and the SPDC and its ally, the DKBA, was that the Peace Council’s prime motivation was helping the Karen people, whereas the DKBA and SPDC thought about making money first.

“The schools are not good, they need to be helped first,” he said.

“The villages get 20,000 kyat a month from the SPDC, that’s not even enough for food.”

He said donations such as that from World Vision, which he claimed on September 27 donated books to a school in Karen State amid much fanfare, were welcome additions to sparse resources.

He said the Peace Council wanted to establish offices in Mae Sot, Thailand, “for the Karen people”, that could help administer aid distribution and trade deals over the other side of the border.

Cash doesn’t seem to be a problem for Tay Lay and just before he left to return to Myawaddy he said he intended to buy a helicopter.

But where would he buy a helicopter from?

“From the Thais of course,” he said, mocking me as if I were a fool for not realising the Thai military did deals with outlaw businessmen aligned to Burma’s military junta.

And for how much?

“Four hundred and fifty thousand baht, it’s an old one,” he said.

“I’ll only fly it once, but I want to fly over Nerdah’s house.”

Tay Lay said his motivation for buying a helicopter was “a show of strength in the face of the SPDC”.

Asked about Tay Lay’s hopes to buy a chopper, Colonel Nerdah simply laughed and said he cannot buy a helicopter”.

“He’s a businessman now, he just comes over the border to see his family,” he said.

Tay Lay’s wife and children live in Khamphaeng Phet.

ENDS

Special Warfare Branch to strike deep, hit strategic targets

MIZZIMA

Don Talenywun

  Mae Sot, Thailand

October 15, 2009

When two explosions rocked the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army compound in the middle of the night, destroying a bulldozer and excavator, the Karen National Liberation Army’s Special Warfare Branch headed for the hills.

It was a rude post-midnight awakening for the DKBA soldiers of Brigade 999, but they quickly assembled a pursuit team.

And they struck out from Ta-ah Tah village, straight up into unforgiving terrain of the Dawna Mountain Range.

They had been hit by a KNLA strike deep behind the lines, a tactic favoured by Karen National Union Vice President David Thackrabaw, and they knew there would be hell to pay for destruction of such expensive machinery.

It is not the first such strike and will not be the last.

The Special Warfare Branch, headed by Brigadier-General Saw Hsar Gay, says this is the result of a new warfare doctrine, using small teams and hitting strategic targets.

The targets are of such value that the teams know hot pursuit will follow and prepare in advance to create a matrix of booby traps that will inflict maximum injury and death on their pursuers.

Some of the key weapons of these matrices are Claymore-style, directional anti-personnel mines, bounding and stake mines.

Brig-Gen Hsar Gay said these weapons were all detonated at the time of engagement, and so proved no danger to the civilian population later on and technically weren’t considered landmines.

“They are triggered either by remote control, electric trigger or a tripwire and, provided strict technical specifications are followed, can be manufactured anywhere.

“They represent the premium defensive weapons as small demolition squads withdraw under fire, or a lethal ambush weapon where a handful of men can hit entire enemy columns without expending ammunition.

“There’s also the benefit of the low risk of casualties,” he said.

These tactics will be spread throughout KNLA battalions.

“It is important to standardise construction of all our boobytraps,” said Brig-Gen Hsar Gay.

“Wherever they are assembled they must be identical, so that performance is streamlined and training and user manuals don’t differ.

“That means our special warfare soldiers can move between battalions and brigades and train others.

“Stealth communications and night warfare are also part of our new doctrine, but implementing these across the force means forming a centralised, homogenous programme using the same hardware, so battalions can carry out very similar coordinated operations, even if they are hundreds of miles from each other.

We’ve changed tactics, out of necessity we must make our weaknesses our strengths,” said Brig-Gen Hsar Gay.

“It’s quite contrary to previous doctrines, where we [the KNLA] wasted a lot of ammunition engaging the enemy in firefights.

“We created the section in 2001 and have since used it to pioneer new tactics that will be employed increasingly in the field by all of our troops,” he said.

“These are unorthodox tactics – behind-the-lines missions and Claymore ambush warfare – that are ideally suited to our outgunned army.”

“The Americans used these tactics as part of their ambush doctrine during the Vietnam War, but only as an ambush initiator, followed by a lot of small arms and machinegun fire, or even heavier weapons.

“But in Karen State we’re doing the opposite – the Claymores, stake and bounding mines are the main weapons and small arms fire is used only for self-defence or if the opportunity to seize enemy weapons and equipment presents itself and covering fire is needed,” he said.

“Our Second and Third brigades are using special warfare tactics with great success, particularly multiple Claymore and boobytrap withdrawals, that’s why the SPDC casualty figures are so high in those brigades.

“But now Sixth Brigade and Seventh Brigade are becoming more capable.

“We’ve trained NCOs [non-commissioned officers] and specially-selected soldiers from most brigades, but the better the tactics are understood by battalion and brigade commanders, the more easier and effective implementation is.”

While the logistical benefits are fairly obvious – the potential loss of life is minimised using small teams, valuable ammunition is preserved and premium weapons carried – there are also direct political benefits.

Earlier this year, frustrated by border warfare marked by shelling and heavy machine-gun fire, Thai authorities ordered leaders of the Karen National Union and its armed wing, the KNLA, off Thai soil.

Things had got out of control and pressuring the side perceived to be weaker – the KNU – was identified as the quickest solution to calm the border region and facilitate trade.

The DKBA, allied with the Burma Army and pitched against the KNLA, was running rampant up and down the border, launching attacks against the KNLA from Thai soil and terrorising Thai villages thought sympathetic to the KNU.

The KNLA tactics of small teams trekking through the jungle for days with one target in mind and avoiding fighting on the borderline will ease relations with the Thais as the matter will be considered an “internal affair” for the Burmese to deal with, said Brig-Gen Hsar Gay.

“The border fighting creates the false impression the KNLA is supported from the other side [the Thai side] of the border.

“It’s important not to affect Thailand’s security interests,” he said.

“And it also shows the KNLA’s ability to fight the Burma Army deep inside areas they claim to control.”

The DKBA broke with the KNLA in the mid nineties, claiming religious persecution of Buddhists by the largely Christian leadership of the KNU.

From its days as a rag-tag bunch of deserters it has developed into a formidable military force.

The DKBA is also one of the few ethnic minority armies to agree with Burma’s military junta, the State Peace and Development Council, and its proposal to form Border Guard Forces from disparate armies controlling areas of Burma.

However, the DKBA is not seen to have the loyalties of the greater Karen population.

Its submission to the will of the SPDC does not augur well with people hard done by for decades at the hands of the Burma Army.

There is little doubt a small band of KNLA specialists on the run from a larger unit of DKBA pursuers would be given sound advice on local conditions or a sock of rice by villagers in a bid to render their mission successful.

Such sentiments are not lost on DKBA foot soldiers.

And now, with their transformation into a border guard force, the DKBA are being issued with badges to be sewn into their uniforms bearing the motifs of the Burma Army.

This is creating dissension in the ranks according to one venerated retired KNLA soldier.

“The [DKBA] brigades are now operating independently of one another, doing what they wish, employing tactics of their own making, following allegiances held by their commanders,” he said.

At a clandestine meeting in Thailand, a commander of another breakaway military clique, the KNU/KNLA Peace Council, said both the SPDC and DKBA had plans to attack a KNLA stronghold opposite northern Thailand, across the Salween River “as soon as the rain stops and things dry up”.

Tay Lay Mya, a son of former KNU general Bo Mya and a surprise defector from the KNLA earlier this year, said both the SPDC and DKBA had their sights set on KNLA Fifth Brigade in coming months.

The once-traditional time for major military offensives by the Burma Army is the dry season, which begins late in the year, about November, and continues through until April.

Both sides are now well-advanced in their preparations for heavy fighting.

One senior KNLA commander involved in these preparations predicted as many as 2,000 refugees Karen could flood out of Burma during the dry season as the battles ensue.

ENDS

OFFICE OF THE SUPREME HEADQUARTERS

KAREN NATIONAL UNION

KAWTHOOLEI

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Restrictions fueling frustration, anger and violence

MIZZIMA

Don Talenywun

  Umphang, Tak, Thailand

September 28, 2009

Trouble is brewing among the refugees of Burma’s war.

Stranded in northern Thailand, fed on rations donated by international community, unable to travel freely and not allowed to work, the populations of the camps strung out along Burma’s border are ready to blow.

Umpheim Mai refugee camp is on tenterhooks, with violence threatening to break out among residents at any time.

A football game on Saturday afternoon descended into crowd violence at game’s end, with gangs of young men attacking each other.

Some camp residents described it as a mini riot.

The current trouble started earlier this month, with a murder of a Burmese resident when he allegedly failed to pay for a cow he had already taken possession of.

When it became obvious he could not pay, the owner is said to have sought his money back, only to find the potential buyer had already slaughtered the beast.

A dispute escalated rapidly from a verbal stoush among two groups of men into physical violence.

Whatever ensued, the alleged “buyer” is now dead.

The camp, situated in Thailand’s in Tak province to the south of Mae Sot and officially home to about 15,000 people, spent months earlier this year on high alert and these latest events have done nothing to ease ethnic tensions.

Residents for months waited in anticipation of an attack by the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army, a militia allied with the Burma Army, the armed wing of Burma’s ruling military junta, the State Peace and Development Council.

Rumours ran wild that the remote camp would be destroyed, with much of the population packed up and ready to flee at a moment’s notice.

It only takes a rumour for a large group of isolated, traumatised people to react unpredictably to minor events.

Law and order in the camps has long been a taboo subject with Thai authorities, lumbered with policing communities that would not exist but for a grinding war of attrition in Burma’s ethnic minority-dominated north.

Thai authorities maintain stringent guidelines for allowing Burmese citizens to become part of the camps, requiring them to be fleeing fighting orchestrated by soldiers of the state.

Thai authorities do not recognise soldiers of the DKBA as soldiers of the Burmese state, creating a propensity by the Burma Army to use allied ethnic militias where it can, and paint the conflict as an ethno-centric struggle for power among rival warlords.

Economic migrants or those fleeing human rights abuses or forced labour do not qualify as refugees, inadvertently creating a vast pool of people who have quietly slipped over Burma’s borders and become part of an illegal workforce.

This workforce, satisfied to work for as little as half the wage of a Thai worker, is estimated by some organisations to number as many as two million.

But for those who do qualify as people who have literally run for their lives, containment in a refugee camp and the inability to achieve anything for themselves results in a frustrated existence.

In Umpheim Mai refugee camp on Saturday that frustration bubbled over into mob violence.

“Football is banned now,” said one refugee.

“And rumour from on high is that the Palat [Thai camp commander] may close the gates [put the camp into total lockdown].

“Things are not good, I’ve never seen it like this before, there is a definite vibe in the air,” said the refugee resident.

“Thai patrols through the camp are random now and the soldiers are clipped up and ready to go [carrying live ammunition in the event they have to quash a riot or mob violence],” he said.

ENDS

The Sangha has given Burma's junta an ultimatum or face the probability of a repeat of the 2007 Saffron Revolution - Photo: PPDD

Another Saffron Revolution could erupt if demands not met

People’s Partner for Democracy and Development

Anna Malindog

  Mae Sot, Thailand

September 30, 2009

A week from now, Burmese monks will again challenge the repressive regime in Burma and again demand from the Burmese military junta the following:

• A public apology for the atrocities the junta has committed against the monks
• The release of all monks now imprisoned

The Sangha has given the military regime an ultimatum: That by October 2, it must have delivered, granting these demands, or face the probability of a repeat of the 2007 Saffron Revolution protests on October 3.

Should the junta fail to meet the demands the monks will once again march and dominate the streets of Burma.

The lack of expectation on behalf of the monks has already led to preparations being made for the protests.

The monks have little doubt the junta will deny the people of Burma peace, freedom and democracy for as long as it can.

This is a battle of wills. The determination of the monks remains steadfast and they will act on behalf of Burma’s people.

The people’s dissatisfaction with decades of oppression will come to a head this week. The monks say they are ready to make the ultimate sacrifice for the people of Burma and intend to occupy streets in urban areas across the territory.

The monks ask for support for their aspirations and solidarity.

This is a conscious effort by the Sangha to facilitate changes in the country, It is a sacred mission and the deepest desire of the Burmese monks to free their country from the yoke of atrocities, brutality, and the bondage of a military regime.

The demand remains the same – peace and freedom for Burma.

The question for the international community is: How can it support the monks on October 3 and during the days following.

Rather than statements – mere words – it is time for action.

The monks face a hostile opponent in Burma’s generals.

It is now up to the world’s common people to demand peace, freedom and justice for Burma.

Anna Malindog is executive director of the non-governmental organisation, Peoples Partner for Democracy and Development.

ENDS

Remnant population of KNU Seventh Brigade struggle on

MIZZIMA

Don Talenywun

  Mae Sot, Thailand

September 16, 2009

Despite their tough living conditions the children at the orphanage aren’t unhappy – they simply forge on.

Individual donors are starting to assist new refugees at Safe Haven Orphanage.

About 200 people have gathered on the grounds of Safe Haven, many of whom are children.

They fled Karen State, finally giving up their shaky hold on homes constantly in danger of attack, during an offensive by the Burma Army and the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army.

The DKBA and Burma Army troops seemed determined to displace the majority of people living in the Seventh Brigade region, suspecting them of supporting Karen National Liberation Army soldiers somehow.

A child yet to be registered squats in the rain in July, after the main offensive thrust by soldiers of the DKBA and SPDC. A cluster of about 200 people found their way to the grounds of Safe Haven Orphanage after the attacks.

But much of the KNLA guerilla force left the area before the enemy arrived.

They left landmines behind them however, and many of the DKBA dead and wounded, which both numbered in the hundreds according to the KNU, fell foul of these booby traps.

But left in limbo were the civilians who lost their homes.

With no shelter at the height of the rainy season they trod up and down mountains, finally crossing the Moei River to relative safety in Thailand.

For now they are allowed to stay where they are, but the chances of establishing a new camp for between 5,000 and 6,000 people displaced is almost nil, because nowhere is secure along the border.

“Gloria”, biological mother to eight children with one on the way and the guardian of another two adopted kids, teaches a small class at Safe Haven.

DKBA are camped not far from Safe Haven, just over the other side of the river in view of anyone from the Thai side.

For now they have not attacked the camp and donors are providing the necessities of life, but mostly things that can be carried so all is not lost in the event of an attack.

More help is needed, mosquito nets and sleeping mats are most important.

Money is urgently needed to buy food and essential items for basic living.
This is an open appeal to anyone who can afford to help these people, victims of an ongoing campaign of genocide to force them from their home country.

ENDS