Daniel Pedersen

Thai officials order relief organisations not to support forces fighting Burma’s junta

Daniel Pedersen
Mae Sot

The United Nations and organisations working along the Thai-Burma border providing relief for refugees from Burma’s grinding civil conflict have been ordered not to support forces fighting for democracy.
At a meeting between Thai provincial governors, the UNHCR and non-governmental organisations, provincial authorities made it clear that any support for the democracy movement would upset bilateral relations with Burma’s ruling generals.
They said this could not be tolerated.
The Thai politicians alleged some aid organisations were providing food for ethnic soldiers fighting against Burma’s ruling military junta.
They also suggested the organisations were taking a substantive risk by travelling to border areas, particularly at night, in a bid to provide aid to those most at risk from the conflict.
The politicians suggested the proper process to manage visits to border areas was to contact the provincial administration for the area concerned and request access.
Tak Deputy Provincial Governor Samat Loifah went as far as to say he was not worried about aid workers dying or being arrested in dangerous areas, because the relationship between Thailand and Burma took precedence over any individual.
He also took aim at Mae Tao Clinic mobile backpack teams, who have been travelling in conflict areas in the midst of heavy fighting, saying they should cease and desist, because they were harming Thailand’s reputation with the junta.
Samat said NGOs working in the border areas should not overstep their authority or “imagine” that the Thai authorities were blocking aid.
But this is at odds with reality on the ground.
In fact Thai soldiers are turning back refugees fleeing across the border at gunpoint and police officers are demanding aid be left with them, rather than being taken to refugees.
A Thai special forces soldier attending the meeting with provincial governors said the Thais had “befriended” the Burmese Army and also had no problems with ethnic fighters.
Thai authorities are desperate to have the Thai-Burma Friendship Bridge re-opened, which has been closed since June 20 last year.
Local businesses in Mae Sot are smarting from the closure.
Observers believe if the Burma Army manages to quell resistance fighters in the area then the bridge may be allowed to reopen and that Thailand is assisting the junta’s troops in its mission by closing down cross-border supply lines.
In late January two combat journalists, John Sanlin and Pascal Schatteman, were arrested by border authorities and detained for four days after having repeatedly crossed the border to record fighting between ethnic Karen fighters and the Burma Army.
The arrests indicated just how lightly the Thai authorities are treading with the Burmese.
Interestingly though, the journalists had informed Thai military intelligence of their intentions, as requested, and were still arrested.
Thai military intelligence officers have since warned all foreigners they will be stopped should they try to cross the border and will be arrested if detected returning from Burma.
Last night at 6.30pm, Karen National Liberation Army Colonel Nerdah Mya said the border had become “very strict”.
“They are not allowing KNU vehicles to move along the border,” he said.

Restaurant bombing kills two

Daniel Pedersen

Mae Sot

Burma’s Myawaddy has again become an urban theatre of war, with two people killed in a bomb blast on Wednesday night near the Thai-Burma Friendship Bridge.

And witnesses said throughout the day on Tuesday they had heard sporadic gunfire from the Rim Moei Market, nestled on the riverbank directly opposite Myawaddy.

The Burmese frontier trading town became famous overnight on election day – November 7 – when soldiers of the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army revolted against their Burma Army overseers, sparking pitched battles in the town’s streets.

Since then, the situation has deteriorated along the border as the junta’s troops seek retribution.

There are more than 10,000 refugees spread along both sides of the Moei River, human minesweepers are being driven ahead of Burma Army troops and hostilities are regularly spilling onto the Thai side.

Said a Thai military intelligence officer: “They’re [both Karen and Burmese troops] using Thailand like a guesthouse.”

Burma’s ruling military junta, the State Peace and Development Council, has ordered its army to embark on a major offensive to secure the border area in a concerted effort to open it up for trade.

The Burma Army has introduced 110mm GPS-guided cannons to the border area and is regularly plying ethnic army-held areas with as many as 200 120mm mortars a day.

It is firepower the ethnic armies of this region cannot match and significant base camps have fallen like dominoes in recent weeks.

Landmines, the main defensive apparatus used to protect their villages, have been detonated by mortar and cannon fire.

To protect themselves against landmines that have not been detonated by heavy artillery, the Burma Army imported 600 prisoners taken from state-run jails to walk in front of them, essentially as mine fodder.

Some sustained serious injury and were hospitalised in Thailand, their stories were corroborated by three escapees who fled across the border.

Soldiers of the ethnic armies, the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army and the Karen National Liberation Army, have been left on the run, sleeping rough in the bush with few supplies.

The DKBA has so far borne the brunt of the Burma Army’s latest offensive.

Until the ruling junta’s November 7 election, the DKBA and the Burma Army had been considered allies.

But a revolt on that day by elements of the DKBA resulted in heavy fighting in the Burmese border town of Myawaddy, opposite Mae Sot in Thailand.

The ensuing onslaught in areas to the south of Mae Sot could be viewed as the Burma Army looking to teach its former ally a lesson.

But things have not gone so well for the Burma Army and it has still not managed to wrest control of the contested areas, according to interviews with former soldiers conducted by the Karen Human Rights Group.

One 17-year-old Burma Army deserter told KHRG: “Our camp was attacked and the ones who got injured the most were us, but the DKBA soldiers did not get injured a lot.

“There were around 500 to 600 soldiers when we started operations but the total soldiers who died by landmines or got shot were over 200,” he said.

He fled the fighting to save his life, he said.

Daniel Pedersen
Journalist

 

“You can fool all the people some of the time, and some of the people all the time, but you cannot fool all the people all the time.”

 

US President Abraham Lincoln, Clinton, Illinois, September 2, 1858.

 

In a city that has been described as the world’s largest brothel, Thailand Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva on Saturday told an audience in Pattaya that Mae Sot in northern Thailand would become a “special economic zone”.

This “zone” will combine Mae Sot and Tha Sai Luad (Mae Tao to the Moei River) municipalities.

The merged administration will be vested with powers to create laws that override national laws and regulations.

On the same day Abhisit made his announcement in Pattaya, human rights organisations marked anti child-trafficking day in Mae Sot.

It is an irony the two events collided, one a press conference to relay a “positive” announcement from a government in need of such proclamations, the other a low-key bid to highlight a tragedy that plays itself out every day along the Burma border.

Conservative estimates have more than 20,000 Burmese sex workers in Thailand at any one time and in 2000, Burma’s Federation of Trade Unions estimated that 80,000 women and children had been sold into Thailand’s sex trade in the preceding 10 years.

In laundries and noodle shops, in clothes stores and coffee shops, in foundries and factories, Burmese citizens, some mere children, carry out the menial labours of Mae Sot.

On the city’s outskirts, Burmese citizens provide the labour to make “brand-name” clothes that are shipped all over the world.

This translates into foreign revenue earnings for Thailand, bolstering its GDP figures.

Every one of the Burmese workers in and around Mae Sot is paid less than the minimum a Thai citizen is legally entitled to.

*****

Thailand’s Board of Investment (BoI), in its 2010 report “The Cost of Doing Business in Thailand” quotes the minimum wage for a Thai citizen in Bangkok at 206 baht a day, “but a little less than that in the provinces”.

Working six days a week, an unskilled Thai worker would earn more than 5,000 baht a month.

A starting wage for a Mae Sot domestic worker, possibly a girl as young as 12, may be as little as 800 baht a month – with a place to sleep and food part of her package.

Progressing to a restaurant or noodle shop, an entry-level wage – again with a place to sleep and food – is 1,200 baht.

However, both of these positions would involve work seven days a week, for as long as 16 hours a day.

For a man, unskilled labouring can pay about 100 baht a day, carpentry or construction work might stretch to 150 baht a day.

This is reality in Thailand’s newest “special economic zone”.

Many businesses would not exist should they be forced to pay Thailand’s minimum wage to their employees, and there would be no-one to do the work anyway.

But just across the Moei River from Mae Sot lies Burma, home to a vast human resource of 50 million-plus, many of whom are heading for Thailand to escape civil conflict and a ruined economy, seeking work that will pay much-needed cash.

Desperation erodes people’s self confidence, but their determination to survive is often accentuated when faced with situations such as Burma’s hopeless economic malaise.

This is where the apparent Burmese preparedness to labour at demeaning jobs stems from.

In Mae Sot Burmese workers constitute the bottom rung of the labour pool.

*****

The creation of special economic zones in Thailand is part of a major decentralisation programme the government has been forced to embark upon.

Constitutionally demanded, Thailand’s 1997 charter – penned during a period of humbling economic failure – requires that local administrations receive a 35 per cent share of the nation’s tax income by 2006.

That didn’t come about, and now tambon and provincial organisations, municipalities and the two special administration zones in Bangkok and Pattaya receive 26 per cent of the Kingdom’s tax revenue.

The constitution’s architects, in demanding a decentralisation of revenue distribution, sought to redress systematic failings made apparent during the 1997 economic meltdown.

On Saturday the Thai PM Abhisit pledged that required 35 per cent share would be achieved across the country within seven years, blaming the 2008 global economic turmoil for the delay.

That such turmoil came two years after the original constitutional deadline did not rate a mention in Abhisit’s Pattaya address.

*****

The Thai government’s Public Relations Department in October 2009 said cross-border trade with Burma amounted to 144 billion baht in 2008, about a fifth of Thailand’s entire trade with neighbouring countries.

The PRD said most of this economic activity was concentrated in Tak province, specifically Mae Sot.

The Tak Chamber of Commerce has been requesting a second bridge across the Moei River for years, citing its load limit of 25 tonnes as problematic.

Construction of that bridge has now been approved and multi-lane arterial roads are rapidly being built leading to the river.

In the meantime the road from Tak to Mae Sot is being expanded from two to four lanes and a railway line mooted.

The PRD also referred to development of a “one-stop service centre and logistics park”.

Abhisit said Mae Sot’s local administration would “be given some authority other local administrations do not enjoy”.

In reality the police and, to a lesser extent, the military control Mae Sot and always have done.

Regular sweeps of the market area by police net bribes to allow illegal migrant workers to avoid arrest.

Bribes paid by factory owners ensure police will not raid their premises.

Police brazenly sell illegal Burmese timber they have seized at the side of the highway leading out of town.

*****

Mae Sot is surrounded by multiple police and military checkpoints to the north, south and east and the Moei River to the west.

For a Burmese migrant worker without appropriate papers, moving in any direction from Mae Sot is impossible, so they are stuck with rock-bottom wages or no work at all.

Yet Thai people-brokers can arrange transportation to Bangkok for illegal immigrants looking or work.

In Bangkok, a starting wage as a domestic servant could be as high as 4,000 to 5,000 baht a month, plus food and a place to sleep.

If the person transporting the illegal worker is caught, they could face two years’ jail, a 50,000-baht fine or both.

The illegal workers would face deportation, landing in the hands of Burma’s endemically-corrupt immigration officials.

Passage to Bangkok usually costs a migrant worker about 12,000 baht – this often comes in the form of a loan, with interest, repayments for which are deducted from their wages each month, sometimes for years.

That Burmese workers are prepared to endure such conditions to escape Mae Sot says a lot about the rewards for toiling in the country’s newest economic zone.

But there is little incentive to become one of Burma’s legal expatriate workers.

The United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) says the ruling Burmese military junta insists foreign workers pay a flat 10 per cent tax on their earnings.

And registered workers are also required to present 50 per cent of their entire earnings to their local Burmese embassy as “funds for their relatives”.

Migrant workers registered in Thailand must also pay 1,300 baht a year for public health insurance.

To register an employee, employers must obtain a worker-registration card from Thailand’s Immigration Department, a cost the employer often passes onto the worker by cutting their wages.

To register a foreign worker without a passport costs 1,500 baht.

*****

On the same day that Mr Abhisit announced Mae Sot would become a special economic zone, People Volunteer’s Association chief Thein Sen was at the knife’s edge of dicey negotiations.

The People Volunteer’s Association has taken several forms since it first came into being in 1994 as the Burma Volunteers Group.

It worked steadily under Thein Sen, a former All Burma Students’ Democratic Front commander, for 12 years helping migrant workers out of any and every fix they found themselves in until 2006, when it became an association registered in Thailand.

In 2008 it changed its name again, to the People’s Volunteer Association because, said Thein Sen, “it must have all the people, we must help everyone, we don’t want to divide people by nationality.

“We really are here to help everyone, Thai bosses, migrant workers, people stuck in the cycle of domestic violence, we come in and help, we come in and help mediate,” he said.

“Some of it is workers’ rights, some ownership or owners’ rights, some domestic violence, we arrange legal aid, we help apprehend people traffickers, we simply make a conscious decision to help people,” he said.

As Mr Abhisit declared that Mae Sot’s local government would become a law unto itself, Thein Sen was dealing with a gun-toting Thai farmer who had become a law unto himself.

Thein Sen said, after eight years working at the same Thai-owned farm, a Burmese migrant family had decided to leave and go back home.

They asked for their wages.

He agreed and asked them to get in his pickup.

Then he drove them to his home where he pointed a gun at them and accused them of stealing 20,000 baht from his sister.

Still at gunpoint, he ordered them to remove their minimal gold jewelry and hand it over to him.

Terrified, they did so, but he demanded more and threatened to kill all of them, all the while waving his pistol in the air erratically.

He held the family hostage and released one man to go in search of more money.

Hearing his tale of woe back in Mae Sot, another family handed over all their gold jewelry so he could have his family released.

When the second family became involved they let Thein Sin know about the situation.

Thein Sen was once a All Burma Students’ Democratic Front commander, used to settling issues with a gun.

*****

The All Burma Students Democratic Front was a product of a violent crackdown upon university students in 1988.

The junta is still paying for its brutality in the form of networks established worldwide to fight for democracy and unhinging the ruling military regime.

In the aftermath of the 1988 crackdown on protests by students the universities were closed and the students who remained alive made for Karen State, into the arms of the Karen National Union.

At the time the KNU and its military wing, the Karen National Liberation Army, maintained a substantial military base at the conjunction of the Salween and Moei Rivers, a safe haven for ethnic armies and the National League for Democracy, the pro-democracy movement headed by Aung San Suu Kyi.

The true death toll of the military’s shooting spree in the capital Rangoon shall never be known because it was obviously covered up by the military regime.

University students walked for days through the jungle under constant attack by their own “government” forces to reach a safe haven protected by landmines and KNLA soldiers.

*****

There is a direct bus between Pattaya and Mae Sot once a day, leaving at 6.30pm.

ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION
Post gets to the truth of the matter

The Bangkok Post
Bangkok

The aged Westerner’s corpse, peacefully dressed in a black suit and tie, emerged from the chiller. My colleague and I were shocked as we were at the morgue inquiring about Awa, a young Shan migrant mauled to death whilst feeding an elephant at a safari park in Chiang Mai.
Awa’s relatives had not come forth to claim his body as they were too scared of arrest as they were unregistered. The assistant explained to us that no death certificate could hence be provided to proceed with legal action; the body would not be cleaned as it would be “disposed of” after a religious ceremony; and Awa was just an illegal Burmese “alien” anyway.
I came to see Awa’s mauled corpse before we left the morgue that day also, and will never forget the bright red blood stains on a plain white hospital sheet.
Awa died for free back then in 2006, and as is usual with migrants in Thailand, he died in tragic silence. Such endings too frequently befall the most unfortunate of Thailand’s two million plus migrant workforce and will continue to do so unless something radically changes in the government’s poor management of migration.
After many years, I now more fully comprehend the symbolism of the contrast between those two corpses I saw that day also – the way in which migrants end up several rungs below everyone else on Thailand’s hierarchical social ladder.
For over 20 years now, the Thai economy has utilised low skilled labourers from neighbouring Cambodia, Laos and Burma to support its rapid economic growth. Migrants’ sweat, and too frequently their blood, assisted in building skyscrapers across the country.
Through inhaling poisonous chemicals and with an ever darkening of their skin, migrants contribute to intensive agricultural projects that litter the countryside. Cleaning homes and caring for sick and elderly relatives, migrant women provide an invaluable social service to Thai families, freeing up women to work in rewarding jobs, yet they are often abused in the confines of homes that they rarely can leave. Migrants’ contribution to the Thai economy has now been quantified beyond doubt, even by World Bank economists.
Thailand’s most senior policy makers insisted during most of these 20 years however that this “illegal” migrant labour force was temporary. Hence a piecemeal “regularisation” programme utilising yearly cabinet resolutions provided enough of a means to regulate their “illegal” stay to “legally” work in the country for one year, prior to deportation at a time of Thailand’s choosing. By failing to formally respond to workers visibly pouring across Thailand’s borders to meet low-skilled labour needs, officials allowed networks of smuggling, trafficking and labour brokers to be formed and finally become entrenched.
In reality, temporary migrant regularisation systems since 1988 ensured more than 2 million workers, over 80% from Burma, remained “illegal” and hence, so senior officials said, could “justly” be denied basic human rights. Rights denied to “registered” migrants include access to compensation, rehabilitation and even disability registration following work accidents, the right to marry, ride a motorbike, travel outside of a province of registration or even own property. Claims Thailand was systematically and unlawfully discriminating against these workers, who are legally allowed to work here, met with constant denials.
The victims of this piecemeal migration management are the hundreds of thousands of migrants who have now lived “temporarily” in Thailand for more than a century. Given most come to Thailand at a relatively young age, it was only natural many would find partners, have children and marry. The official response has been a public demonising of the harm caused to Thailand’s social fabric by pregnant migrant women and the burden on resources by stateless migrant children. Whilst frequent threats to begin deporting pregnant women have yet to bear fruit, and despite some limited positive developments, most migrant children remain unregistered and uneducated and a clear policy to deal with them remains absent.
Officials continue to insist irregular migration flows into Thailand are a severe national security threat also. Which begs the question of what “national security” means. Does it mean ensuring the continuance of corruption which remains pervasive in the way this informal labour force is managed, an undermining of the rule of law or the ability to ensure a work force of over 2 million contribute where needed to the country’s economic growth but continue to live in grossly exploitative situations? If so, then Thailand’s security remains strong.
But if “national security” encapsulates even a basic level of human security for migrants and requires a formalisation of migration systems which can benefit Thailand’s economy, its population, as well as employers and migrant’s equally, Thailand is seriously at risk.
Social tension between migrants and their Thai hosts in the villages across the country seems to be increasing as Thais understand little who migrants are, why they are here and why their communities have, in their view, literally been taken over. This was seen most clearly when Ranong’s residents recently came out to protest that migrants passing the nationality verification process should not be allowed to apply for motorbike licences. Most media wields its power with gross irresponsibility and deep prejudice to publicly demonise migrants in support of the official line that these workers are an unwanted burden on the country. Suggesting migrants are a burden rather than a benefit for Thailand doesn’t ring true, however, once deep prejudice is shifted aside. Services registered migrants pay for are under-used, social welfare is denied to this group and the government has few policies to improve migrant’s quality of life.
Arguing migrant salaries are higher here than in their home countries and that they are lucky to be allowed to stay in Thailand, given their illegal entry, should not be used to silence criticism of a disrespect of basic human rights principles so as to consolidate power over a cheap, competitive and easily exploitable low-skilled migrant workforce. Suggesting migrants are stealing Thai workers’ jobs is to place the blame in the wrong place too, as employers act as the pull factor for migration into the country. An ongoing failure to modernise work methods to increase productivity and instead a reliance on a cheap migrant labour force which the country itself cannot produce may well soon contribute to Thailand’s decreased global competitiveness. The next 20 years will not be the same as the last in terms of global economics, so the government’s migration policy should perhaps seek to adapt. Thailand will soon no longer be able to compete with other regional countries on low cost production. Global consumers are now more concerned about ethnical work practices and less likely to purchase products produced through exploitation. Some seek to give the government credit for its strategy, planned since 1999 but only recently begun to be implemented, to formalise the “irregular” migration landscape of the country in three stages. First, verify the nationality of all “illegal” migrants in Thailand and issue them with temporary passports so they can become “legal” through the nationality verification (NV) process. Second, bring in fresh “legal” labour to meet strictly quantifiable labour shortages through formal government to government agreements. And third, register “illegal” migrants currently in the country to “legally” work temporarily only until these latter two principle aims can be achieved. But it seems the embedded and negative forces from two decades of informal migration management continue to be too strong for this formalisation strategy to ever succeed.
Since 2002 when the formal labour import channels were first agreed on, only around 25,000 workers have legally been brought into Thailand (that averages out at around 3, 000 per year). The NV process continues to be a non-transparent and expensive mess. Around a million of the estimated 2 million plus migrants in Thailand formally entered the process by a Feb 28, 2010 deadline that was backed up with the coercive threat of mass deportations if they didn’t comply. This coercive style of working, particularly its effect on Burma’s ethnic minorities working here, was condemned by the UN.
With around a million workers having until Feb 28, 2012 to complete NV, if the “verification” of biographical information sent to migrants’ home countries is genuine, the government will soon realise a significant number of migrants, particularly those from Burma’s ethnic minorities, inserted false information into the process to get work permit extensions for another 2 years. This was out of fear and confusion because of neglect on behalf of the Ministry of Labour to raise public awareness on what NV was about amongst the workers and their employers before setting down unrealistic deadlines.
Clearly symbolic of Thailand’s treatment of migrants is broker exploitation. Both as part of NV and the new import system, the complexity of both processes mean a broker is a necessity. If Thailand was really genuine about solving its irregular migration challenges, the costs involved in using these brokers would be reduced to provide incentives for migrants and employers to comply. Instead, broker systems remain unregulated in practice, despite some informal caps announced by the Ministry of Labour, and costs remain extortionately high both for employers and workers. Rumours abound regarding who is behind these companies. Huge profits being reaped by brokers are usually passed on to migrants themselves, and for workers earning so little already, that creates a grossly unfair situation where debt bondage results.
On June 2, 2010 Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva entered into the migration debate by signing an order to set up a “special centre to suppress, arrest and prosecute alien workers who are working underground”. The crackdown that followed this was stated to be an essential part of the government’s strategy to formally manage migration by arresting and deporting migrants who refused to enter the NV process to allow them to be imported back to Thailand legally. What resulted however was a well documented “arrest and extort” policy of the police and related officials affecting both unregistered and registered workers. International media began to expose a lack of formal deportation practices with transfers of Burmese migrants into a revolving and vicious cycle of extortion and trafficking involving brokers, officials and ethnic militias in Mae Sot/Myawaddy and at Ranong/Kawthaung.
Amidst the deputy prime minister’s public announcement of an intensifying unregistered migrant crackdown, and despite the government’s insistence there would never be another opportunity for those unregistered migrants in the country to register without returning home and entering again legally, plans for a new registration process for unregistered migrants has just been announced in a policy U-turn due to low skilled labour shortages. Whilst welcome, the wheel of poor migration management spins full circle again.
Systematic discrimination continues against migrants, prejudice abounds and social tension rises. Corruption goes untackled and brokers become stronger. Migrants continue to suffer gross exploitation by employers, systematic extortion by government officials (particularly by police and others who are supposed to protect them), and now a heavy burden from the costs of formalisation processes that, when weighed up, rarely seem to benefit them. Such was the recent experience of thousandsof striking migrants in Khon Kaen who, after completing NV and still getting few rights, decided enough was enough.
Senior officials are saying more often these days that the time has arrived to solve this migration mess in more rational ways, considering human rights alongside national security and economic need. A parliamentary labour committee has drafted a new migrant law, and Mr Abhisit keeps saying this year’s census will reveal how many migrants are really in Thailand to provide data to support more considered migration policies in the future. Evidence suggests census teams are having a hard time finding the migrants, however, as employers continue to keep them well covered up.
More than 20 years of irregular migration have passed now. Considering how many migrants have faced the same fate as Awa, unequal even in death, is not a pleasant thought. Migrants remain silent and unorganised in the face of all this exploitation with just a handful of positive examples of their fighting for and accessing justice, despite hundreds of NGOs seeking to assist. The outlook for Thailand’s low skilled migrants remains bleak unless the government urgently moves to prioritise the improving of their lot.
Maybe then the time has come for morality to be discussed when considering Thailand’s management of migration. For most of these migrants come from Burma, the pariah of Asean and the symbol of all that is undemocratic in governance in the region. One can accept that the root cause of these irregular migration flows is not wholly Thailand’s responsibility, but the country is reaping huge benefits from a massive and easily exploitable Burmese workforce, so accepting this burden comes at a cost.
If Thailand continues to neglect these workers and reap the benefits without fulfilling the duty to treat them well, perhaps one can conclude that numerous administrations have been successful in manufacturing and then upholding a social zone of unlawfulness we see today in which migrants fall beyond basic protection mechanisms, the rule of law and are denied even the most basic human rights.
Thailand’s policies have for too long contributed to the immoral exploitation of these “temporary” workers. So perhaps the time has come for Thailand to receive a bit of the condemnation for gross human rights violations against the Burmese people which is usually reserved only for its dictatorial neighbour.

Andy Hall is currently a consultant to the Human Rights and Development Foundation and was director of HRDF’s Migrant Justice Programme from 2007 to 2010.

Mizzima

Bern Smith

Mae Sot

An exodus of refugees in numbers never before seen along the Thai-Burma border could begin within days, the KNU/KNLA Peace Council has warned.

In a plea to the “international community”, the Peace Council this week said 6,000 to 10,000 people could initially be evacuated, but if the Burma Army made a clean sweep of its capital, as many as 100,000 people could be affected.

The KNU/KNLA Peace Council signed an agreement with Burma’s ruling military junta, the State Peace and Development Council, in 2006 when it broke away from the Karen National Union.

Since then it has developed a capital on the western side of the Dawna mountain range, at Hto Kaw Ko, and its leaders have entered into business arrangements with the Burma Army.

Peace Council leaders have been consistently accused of switching sides merely to enrich themselves.

Earlier this year the SPDC demanded ethnic groups transform themselves into Border Guard Forces, taking orders directly from the Burma Army.

The KNU/KNLA Peace Council has repeatedly refused to become an armed wing of the Burma Army and steadfastly refused to fight troops of the Karen National Liberation Army. But now the SPDC has demanded the Peace Council begin obeying orders or be declared an “unlawful or illegal organisation”.

Burma Army Lt-Gen Ye Myint has met with Peace Council leaders and delivered an ultimatum: Join forces with us by Sunday or the population of Hto Kaw Ko will be displaced and your capital destroyed.

In a move that could be perceived as tactically unwise, Peace Council leaders say they dismissed the demand on the spot and began preparing to defend themselves.

The Peace Council is well armed – this correspondent has seen truckloads of brand new M-60s and M-16s and many thousands of rounds of ammunition in their possession.

A spokesman for the Peace Council said: “If the Burmese determine to breach and violate the peace agreement and initiate war, then the Karen will have no choice but to do everything in their power to defend [themselves].

“However [if the] safe area [Hto Kaw Ko] is no longer considered safe, the children and families may have to cross over the border into Thailand.

“Acceptance by the Thais is not certain,” the spokesman said.

Elements of the KNLA last night declared that they would flank KNU/KNLA Peace Council units if they were forced to evacuate to the Thai-Burma border.

KNLA Colonel Nerdah Mya, eldest son of the late KNLA General Bo Mya, said: “We are all Karen and the people must be defended.”

He said his men would certainly help the Peace Council forces if they were attacked by the Burma Army and found themselves in danger of being overwhelmed.

Colonel Nerdah’s primary concern was for the civilian population, he said.

By all accounts it is unlikely the Thais will accept thousands of Peace Council refugees pouring over the border. While contingency plans have been made for three sites around Mae Sot – at Tha Son Yang, Phop Phra and Umphang – there are strict conditions for people seeking refuge in Thailand.

Anyone who comes across the border must be directly fleeing fighting and no combatants of any side, or their families, will be given food or shelter.

The Thai Third Army, which controls an area from Kanchanaburi in the south to Mae Hong Son in the far north, maintains the dispute between the SPDC and the Peace Council is an “internal affair”, one for the Burmese to sort out amongst themselves.

While NGO workers along the border are treating the situation developing between the Peace Council and the Burma Army as a serious matter, they remain sceptical that 100,000 people might flee Burma.

Faced with reduced capacity because international donors are becoming fatigued by more than six decades of fighting in Karen State, the organisations providing for refugees are hoping they are not inundated with tens of thousands of new arrivals from Burma.

But, should the Burma Army make a clean sweep from Hto Kaw Ko to the Thai-Burma border, the number of people fleeing could well dwarf last year’s exodus to Tha Son Yang.

Last year, during June and July, about 6,500 people ended up on the Thai side in Tha Son Yang district when the KNLA lost its Seventh Brigade region to the Burma Army-aligned militia, the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army.

What followed was a disaster, as people clustered in small groups along the border and NGOs scrambled to keep up with simple needs, such as sanitation, food and shelter.

ENDS

Asian Energy

August 16, 2010

Thailand’s oil and gas developer PTTEP says it wants to sell minority stakes in five gas blocks in Burma for which it has exclusive exploration and production licenses. The Thai government-controlled company has 100 percent ownership of the development rights in the blocks, which include the rich M9 in the Gulf of Martaban.

The Thai government-controlled company has 100 percent ownership of the development rights in the blocks, which include the rich M9 in the Gulf of Martaban.

Only two weeks ago, PTTEP signed a deal with Burma’s junta-controlled oil and gas agency, the Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE), to buy 80 percent of the gas produced from M9.

PTTEP has previously said the block is estimated to hold about 50 billion cubic meters of gas, and could begin delivering more than 8 million cubic meters per day by 2014.

It had been expected that MOGE would take the other 20 percent of the M9 output.

However, this week PTTEP chief executive Anon Sirisaengtaksin said he wants to sell stakes in M9 and the M3, M4, M7 and M11 to “diversify investment risks.”

PTTEP is also seeking to raise capital to help fund a bid for BP’s assets in Vietnam which the British company plans to sell to help pay for Gulf of Mexico oil leak damage.

Industry observers think potential investors in PTTEP’s five Burma blocks will include China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) and India’s GAIL and Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited (ONGC) companies.

CNOOC expressed interest in buying into the M9 block in 2008.
GAIL and onGC are involved in developing two blocks of the huge Shwe gas field in the Bay of Bengal, most of which is being sold to China.

Thailand seeks to dilute cost of developing Burma gas fields

Mizzima

By Bern Smith

August 15, 2010

The Thai-Burma Friendship Bridge, spanning the Moei River between Mae Sot and Myawaddy, is open – at the right price and under the cover of darkness.

Thai traders in Mae Sot have told Mizzima that trucks laden with goods can pass over the bridge if the right people are paid the right money.

Shipments must be arranged via Democratic Karen Buddhist Army commander Chit Thu and Thai authorities must be paid, the traders said, on condition of anonymity.

The bridge was closed by Burma in early July, allegedly because of moves by Thailand to construct a wall along its side of the river, beefing up security along the international border.

The Tak Chamber of Commerce has since demanded the Thai government intervene and negotiate with the Burmese, claiming 20 days of closure had cost Thailand revenue of 20 billion baht.

Thai promises to supply construction materials and pay labour costs to build a structure on the Burmese side initially seemed to have healed the rift between the two neighbours.

But then, say Thai business sources, the Burmese side upped the ante, demanding 50 new trucks also be handed over as part of the deal to re-open the bridge.

It seems Thai pragmatism and the desire by the DKBA to make money to supply its bitterly-divided fighting force has since spurred new arrangements.

Now shipments can pass across the Friendship Bridge late at night, or as Thai sources say, “always about midnight”.

Thai authorities are now charging an extra baht per kilogram for goods passing across the bridge, making the total 21 baht per kilogram.

Thai businessmen said with breakaway elements of the DKBA fighting against the Burma Army, the Karen militia’s need for money was greater than ever.

The Karen National Liberation Army’s Colonel Nerdah Mya confirmed smuggling activities were occurring, but said it was not the DKBA behind the operation.

He said certainly such movements across the bridge in the dead of night would have to be approved by Chit Thu but, “You must remember that Chit Thu has already signed an agreement with the SPDC, he is SPDC.”

Colonel Nerdah said the movements across the unmanned bridge were not political, but rather “people just trying to make money”.

But the facts are inescapable.

The SPDC ordered the bridge closed in protest against a Thai plan to bolster security along its international border.

In what could only be considered bilateral blackmail, Burmese authorities then demanded construction materials and money from the Thais to reopen the bridge.

The Tak Chamber of Commerce then supplied the cement and promised to pay labour costs for the Burmese to build their own wall along their side of the Moei River.

But the bridge remains closed, and the SPDC, troops of which have vice-like control of Myawaddy, is now allowing illicit illegal international trade across the bridge.

ENDS

Mizzima, August 06, 2010

The regime’s biggest threat for the past half-century, besides Aung San Suu Kyi, has been rebel armies from various ethnic groups. For decades the regime has worked to increase its presence in these rural areas by building paramilitary allies in hostile regions. The local militias suppress rebel activities in exchange for the freedom to produce and transport drugs with full military co-operation. As the military brokered more deals, its obsession with power quickly took precedence over its war on drugs. Now the regime is more powerful than ever, due to a survival strategy that is largely subsidised by Burma’s multi-billion-dollar drug trade. Perry Santanachote examines trade, the people who benefit from it and cover it up, the victims and those caught in between

Welcome to Shan State: land of the drug lords

Aung Min, like many in Rangoon, grew up poor. He enlisted in the Burmese army in 1999 at the age of 18 with ambitions that he would one day join the ranks of his commanding officers. By 2003 he was a second lieutenant stationed in Laukkaing Township in Shan State and led a group of 20 men – his pockets filled reliably with drug money.

Opium production has been an economical lynchpin in eastern Shan State since the late 1940s when military leaders refused to honour the Panglong Agreement that granted autonomy to ethnic states. Rebel armies grew as their drug trade took over the region, and then the world. Shan warlord Khun Sa dominated Southeast Asia’s infamous Golden Triangle with his heroin enterprise through the 1980s and 1990s. By 1995, the Golden Triangle, the mountainous region where Burma, Laos and Thailand meet, became the world’s leader in opium production. His 30-year revolutionary war ended in 1996 but heroin continues to flow out of the state, albeit at a lower rate, with a new breed of drug lords.

Despite acknowledgement by the US State Department that poppy cultivation in Burma today is less than 20 per cent of what it was in the mid-1990s, it’s still an annual multi-billion-dollar business. Burma remains the world’s second-largest opium producer after Afghanistan, and processed 330 metric tonnes, or 17 per cent, of last year’s world supply, according to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 2010 World Drug Report. Poppy cultivation has also been on a steady incline for the past three years.

Other pages in the report show that Burma is also Asia’s largest producer of amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS), which include methamphetamine, distributed in the form of the cheap and chemically dirty pills, most commonly known in Thailand and the region as ya baa (crazy drug); and the more expensive and cleaner crystalline form known as Ice. Burmese production of methamphetamine coincided with reduced opium production, but producers did not necessarily switch over.

“There has been more production last year when it comes to stimulants because of the increased involvement by the junta-backed militia groups,” Khun Seng, an editor at the independent media and research group Shan Herald Agency for News (SHAN), said. “When the militia groups support the political aspirations of the junta they are also supported by the junta in their drug activities.”

“And if you’re the drug boss,” he added. “You’ll do anything that’ll bring in money. If I’m producing more meth it is because of the market – the buyers. Right now, for two years in a row, opium production has been down so there is less production of heroin than in other years, that’s all. They are not intentionally switching from heroin production to meth production.”

Pornthep Eamprapai, director of the Office of the Narcotics Control Board in Chiang Mai, said heroin and opium production was down because of climatic conditions and drought, not because of eradication. “Meth” quickly filled that gap in recent years, he said, because consumer demand in Thailand is high due to economic and social instability. Thais are becoming addicted to ya baa at an alarming rate, while they were never too keen on heroin.

“Making meth is so much easier too,” Pornthep said. “Cooking up meth or Ice doesn’t require any crop.”

Another big difference between today’s drug trade and that of the Khun Sa era, is that it is now increasingly controlled by the government. Former Prime Minister Khin Nyunt engineered a series of ceasefires with major drug-producing militias in 2003-2004 and incorporated them into the economy and constitutional process, creating an environment conducive to drug production and collusion between military personnel and drug traffickers. The regime has been suspected of involvement in the drug trade in the past but never at the level seen today.

In the past decade, the military regime has prioritised keeping it under wraps and making it appear as though it has waged a war on drugs. In 1999 the military inducted a 15-year drug-eradication programme, made lofty promises to the international community to crack down on trafficking, publicised some token drug busts and even opened an anti-drug museum. But these acts were all sleight of hand – an illusion to placate the international community. Although, they may have worked.

The UNODC commended the junta for its “considerable decrease in the area under cultivation and a strong decline in potential opium production” in its Opium Poppy Cultivation Report last year and budgeted US$7.7 million for the eradication programme between 2004 to 2007.

“It’s just another attempt to get the international community to pay for ordinary development programmes instead of using the state budget for that purpose,” said Chiang Mai-based author Bertil Lintner, who chronicled the history of Burma’s heroin warlords in his book, Burma In Revolt, and more recently the multi-billion-dollar methamphetamine trade in Merchants of Madness: The Methamphetamine Explosion in the Golden Triangle.

“And most of the UNODC’s programmes are just that – ordinary development programmes that have little or nothing to do with drug eradication,” Lintner said.

Pornthep says the Thai government gives Burma 20 million baht (US$625,000) annually every year for opium eradication.

“Their [Burma’s] government isn’t doing enough because they don’t have the resources,” he said. “Therefore they need co-operation and aid from other countries.”

Eleven years later, drug lords continue to operate with impunity and the Burmese Army remains closely involved in the lucrative opium economy, using it as leverage against ceasefire armies. As its deadline approaches, Burma is nowhere near being a drug-free nation. Only 13 townships of the targeted 51 can claim to be poppy-free, while the others are still growing, according to the 2009 Shan Drug Watch Report.

Drug economics in Burma’s new political order

Drug economics in Burma’s new political order, part 1

Drug economics in Burma’s new political order, part 2

Drug economics in Burma’s new political order, part 3

Critics charge unstable nation dealing with China, North Korea

WorldNetDaily

Michael Carl

July 16, 2010

U Aung, 53 years old, an Intha leg rowing fisherman holds his cone shaped net, used to catch fish March 2, 2007 on Inle Lake, Myanmar (Burma). The 22 kilometre long lake is also eleven kilometres wide.The fisherman of this region are famous for their leg rowing technique, standing on the stern on one leg and wrapping the other leg around the oar.

According to the Intha this allows the fisherman to better see the many obstacles in the large lake, offering relief to their arms. The fisherman usually catch Nga-hpein, which is a type of carp, selling for about USD1.00 per fish. With economic sanctions crippling the Burmese economy its people are eager for change and a better life.

According to government experts who are working on a seven step road map to democracy, within the next few months the Draft Constitution will be finalized which will hopefully bring a Referendum for Constitution by the end of the year. After that a Democratic election will be held in 2008.

According to the current scenario the change may happen soon but many say that Burmese will be afraid to vote with their heart but will cast their vote to prevent trouble.

The military regime in Burma, marginally in control of a Buddhist-dominated nation that has been torn by clan and tribal strife for decades, apparently is trying to strengthen its position by attempting to buy weapons-grade uranium and nuclear technology from Asian and European nations.

Several experts have confirmed to WND the moves, and say they believe the efforts are to be a bargaining tool to pacify opposition in the upcoming October elections. Others say the power will be used against the West and other political opponents.

Vision Without Borders president Patrick Klein said Burma’s major technology source is the closed regime in North Korea.

“North Korea is helping them develop nuclear weapons,” Klein reported.

What do prominent U.S. leaders have in common with rogue tyrants? Read Jamie Glazov’s groundbreaking “United in Hate: The Left’s Romance With Tyranny and Terror”

Karen National Union Vice Chairman David Tharckabaw adds the program is farther along than just getting uranium from other countries.

“We had a report from the inside that they’re mining uranium to use in a nuclear reactor. They have a secret arrangement for building a nuclear reactor,” Tharckabaw explained.

“They’re sending out state callers to Russia, to Japan and to China to acquire expertise to nuclear weapons,” Tharckabaw added. “Germany has also been one of Burma’s contacts for technology.”

Listen to an interview with Tharckabaw:

The Karen leader agreed that North Korea also is one of the nations that is assisting Burma in its nuclear-weapons program.

“The technology will definitely lead to nuclear bomb production,” Tharckabaw added.

Klein reports that on two occasions within the past year, weapons shipments from one or more Asian countries have been intercepted.

“There was a ship heading from North Korea to Burma and the ship was full of arms. One of the U.S. warships followed that ship and the ship turned around and went back to North Korea,” Klein stated.

“There was another plane a couple of months later and it was flying through Bangkok. They found it was loaded with arms as well and, from what I understand, that plane was headed for Burma,” Klein continued.

“Burma is amassing arms and it looks like they’re working on getting a nuclear weapon if they can,” Klein said.

While Iran’s nuclear program has been grabbing the attention around the world in recent months, Klein said, in fact, there are two active nuclear programs in Burma.

“They have one that is a civilian program that is for research. They have one that is a secret one, for the military. Both are going on simultaneously,” Tharckabaw said.

The Karen leader adds that the nuclear weapon will be used as a “power tool” by the military dictatorship.

“The Burmese military is full of megalomaniacs and they want to use the weapons to build an empire. There have been three empires, and they see themselves as building the fourth Burmese Empire,” Tharckabaw further explained.

Human-rights lawyer and Burma analyst Scott Johnson agrees.

“While the (State Peace and Development Council regime) hasn’t explicitly written why it wants nukes, the most logical reason is that the regime like many military authoritarian governments wants to retain power. For decades they have been under threat for their appalling human-rights records – both from international condemnation and internal strife from a hostile population,” Johnson said.

The Australian-based lawyer adds that the regime uses deliberately heavy-handed tactics and is a copycat of another notorious Asian regime.

“The regime holds itself in power via a police state, bolstered by economic and military support from China (and others) and thus seeks the ultimate weapon, i.e., nuclear weapons, to ensure its survival. In this respect it is emulating North Korea,” he said.

Johnson adds that the Burmese junta needs China.

“China is Burma’s big brother and the natural-gas and oil pipelines will soon be connected through Burma to China. Thus, it’s safe to say that the regime wants nukes merely to bolster its image and ensure they are untouchable like North Korea and Iran,” Johnson added.

The Karen National Union leader believes that the nuclear project shows that Burma is trying to be like its authoritarian Asian neighbors.

“They want to imitate North Korea. North Korea is going ahead with its bomb-making and not worried about the democratic countries, like South Korea. They know that South Korea can’t react,” Tharckabaw said.

“The international community is trying to deal with it and North Korea is going ahead. Burma wants to be like that,” the Karen leader added.

The Karen leader says that the Burmese government is attempting to eliminate any political opposition from the outside and on the inside. Klein says that the Thai military is helping Burma in its effort to eliminate ethnic minorities.

“Some of the Thai generals are working with the Burmese generals. What we’re hearing is that they’re trying to wipe out a lot of Karen people. We’re hearing that with the elections coming in October, they’re trying to wipe out everyone who is opposed to the government,” Klein explained.

Klein adds that this collaboration has led to some major human-rights abuses on both sides of the border.

“My contacts are concerned that they’re going to try to kill the men in the villages, let the women and children flee to Thailand to the refugee camps, and then the Thai generals are going to force the women and children back into Burma to clear the minefields,” Klein said.

Klein adds that Thailand’s interest is financial.

“There’s a lot of lumber coming out of Burma into Thailand, a lot of drugs and a lot of gems. There’s a lot of money that needs to be made,” Klein continued.

Listen to an interview with Klein:

“One day when we were in the refugee camps, the Thai border police were there and they were threatening to send the kids back into Burma for $15 a head,” Klein observed.

David Tharckabaw agrees that financial arrangements are a part of the Burmese government’s dealings with their Asian neighbors.

Klein adds that he’s apprehensive about what happens between now and the October elections.

“I’m concerned that there may be a big slaughter before the election. The tribal people and the Burmese people too are against the military regime,” Klein warned.

Klein also says there are large armies from the Karens and the other tribes that are fighting against the government.

It’s a major concern of human-rights groups that the Burmese government is attempting to kill everyone who may oppose the military government.

Klein agrees with Tharckabaw that the Burmese government is trying to make the rest of the world believe that the military government is popular.

“The election is already cut-and-dried. The government has rigged the vote, and I think they’re going to try to make sure the vote comes out 75 percent in favor of the government,” Tharckabaw explained.

“The only thing anyone can do is boycott the vote. But it’s hard to boycott the vote,” Tharckabaw added.

Klein adds that the U.N. has been unwilling to take action against the Burmese military regime. He says that both Russia and China have used their vetoes in the U.N. Security Council to prevent any action from being taken.

WorldNetDaily Exclusive

ENDS

DVB

Francis Wade

July 16, 2010

The fallout from the global recession has combined with tightening economic sanctions on Burma to cause an apparent nosedive in foreign investment over the past year, Burmese government statistics show.

A report by the Ministry of National Planning and Development, seen by AP, shows that overseas investment fell 68 percent, or US$670 million, in the 2009-10 fiscal year. This is despite Burma sealing seven new investment deals in that period, four of which were in its lucrative oil and gas sector, AP said.

The Burmese economy is in a phase of wholesale reinvention, with the government selling off swathes of previously state-owned industry to private businesses. It is also busily attracting more foreign investment, largely from neighbouring China, India and Thailand. The majority is focused on its energy sector and extractive industries.

But while overseas investment figures may have fallen, the ruling junta is still waiting for the activation of a number of projects that will eventually net them billions of dollars. The Shwe dual-pipeline project, which will carry oil and gas from Burma’s western shores to southern China, is likely to generate some US$30 billion over the three decades after it comes online in 2012.

Moreover, much of the revenue from these projects is believed to be stashed in foreign banks, mainly Singaporean, and will therefore not show up in government figures, which are commonly believed to be tweaked to avoid close scrutiny of its economic practices. Poor economic indicators also provide ammunition for the junta in its claims that sanctions are hurting Burmese people.

Burma remains one of the world’s least developed countries, despite the swift rise of many of its regional neighbours. Last year it ranked 138 out of 182 countries on the UN’s Human Development Index, while the UN Development Programme said last month that Burma would struggle to meet any of the Millennium Development Goals by 2015.

Given the crutch that burgeoning trade with China in particular has given, much of the Western community is now questioning the worth of sanctions, first implemented by the US in 1997. The boycott had intended to force the regime on a path toward democratic transition, but Burma is now heading towards elections this year that appear set to entrench military rule.

The economic powerhouses of the Asia-Pacific region – notably China, Thailand and Singapore – have refused to join the US and EU in implementing sanctions, while trade with Burma’s giant to the west, India, is gaining in momentum. Burma supplies some 80 percent of Thailand’s gas, while for strategic reasons China is keen to secure the deposits and ports of the Bay of Bengal for its energy needs.

An Economist Intelligence Unit report this month said that economic growth in Burma will accelerate next year, but if one were to discount the expansion of the gas and hydropower industries, the economy will remain weak and growth “sluggish”.

DVB

ENDS

The Nation

Nalin Viboonchart

July 16, 2010

Investors from many Thai sectors are looking to Burma, with its low operating costs, abundant natural resources and large market, according to the Thai-Myanmar Business Council.

Representatives of Burma’s private sector visited the council in recent weeks to lobby Thai industries to establish manufacturing plants in the country, whose official name is Myanmar, said Thai-Myanmar Business Council Santi Vilassakdanont. Promising sectors in Burma include food processing, agriculture-related industries, consumer products and garments, he said.

Burma will hold a general election at the end of this year. It is expected that the new Burmese government will establish investment incentives aimed at foreign businesses.

“Burma has been opening its country to foreign investment since member nations agreed to implement the Asean Economic Community by 2015. Asean will become a single market under this agreement, and Burma does not want to be left behind. We’re cooperating closely with the private sector in Burma,” Santi said.

Moreover, Burmese authorities want to create jobs. At present, many Burmese labourers work in Thai manufacturing plants on the countries’ border. It makes sense for the Burmese to encourage these people to work in their home country, he said.

The Thai-Myanmar Business Council plans to take a delegation, including about 20 Thai businesspeople, to Burma next month, Santi said. During the visit, the two countries will sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) securing the supply of certain Burmese agricultural products to the Thai food-processing industry, as well as garment exports from Thailand to Burma.

Thai manufacturers will also be given opportunities to meet and establish relationships with Burmese businesspeople.

Santi said he had also received expressions of interest from representatives of firms in such heavy-industry sectors such as steel and cement, as well as from the energy industry, about investing in Burma.

Other countries, including China and Singapore, are also looking for investment opportunities in Burma. Santi said Thailand needs to take advantage of its geographical proximity to Burma and its historical ties with the country’s people.

“Thai industries should pay more attention to investing in Burma as the operating costs in that country, such as labour and land costs, are lower than in Thailand. Besides, the investment regulations in Burma are less stringent than in our country right now. We don’t know yet when the Southern Seaboard project will be ready for new investment,” he said.

The Thai-Myanmar Business Council was set up in February this year as collaboration between the Federation of Thai Industries (FTI), the Thai Chamber of Commerce and the Thai Bankers Association. Santi, who is a former chairman of the FTI, is the first chairman of the council.

The Nation

ENDS

STRATFOR

May 19, 2010

In a success for Thailand’s armed forces, the military offensive against Red Shirt protesters in central Bangkok ended May 19.

The opposition Red Shirts now find themselves in a weakened position, but even so, they are not likely to fade away completely.

With the end of the offensive, the ruling Democrat Party now has bought itself some time to deal with the remaining challenges it faces ahead of elections that must be called no later than December 2011.

For its part, the Thai army has emerged in a much stronger position.

Analysis

Thai troops ended their offensive in downtown Bangkok at the main rally site of the United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship or “Red Shirt” protesters May 19. At 1pm local time, Red Shirt leaders in police custody asked their followers to go home. The operation concluded at 2 pm local time, with a total of about five dead and 50 wounded for the day.

Bangkok and 23 provinces in the north and northeast will be under curfew all night as police and the military attempt to put out fires, prevent follow-on attacks and stop sporadic small riots and any lingering protesters.

Most of the 3,000 or so protesters who remained until the very end will be taken to a stadium, loaded on buses and sent back to those north and northeastern provinces from where most of them came.

The army appears to have executed the final operation successfully. Some had feared the operation might last all of May 19 and even push into the next day. And the death toll was remarkably small compared to the nearly 40 who died in fighting from May 13-17 and the 26 or so who died in April 10 clashes.

That said, the bloodshed in recent months has exceeded that of periods of comparable unrest in the country in 1976 and 1992.

The low body count on May 19 is partially a result of the army’s ability to avoid pushing forces directly into the main protest; instead, it managed to shut down the protest by encircling it.

Only limited Red Shirt protests or violence occurred outside of Bangkok on May 19. In one instance of violence, some 5,000 protesters stormed the town hall in Udon Thani in reaction to the crackdown and calls for a general uprising. The crowd threatened to set fire to the building with car tires and fuel.

Elsewhere, 1,000 protesters broke through the main gate of the town hall in Khon Kaen. Neither of these events escalated into major conflict with security, however.

both locations are part of the Red Shirt movement’s northeastern support base, persistent attacks against public buildings and incidents of arson bear close scrutiny, as they might erupt into a greater conflagration.

The Red Shirt movement is now in very bad shape. Four of its top leaders were arrested May 19, and many of their deputies are also likely now (or soon will be) in custody. The arrestees, as well as a handful of powerful people behind the scenes, face vigorous prosecution and could face terrorism charges, which can carry capital punishment.

Other Red Shirts fled the scene before the final showdown, while military snipers assassinated the most radical Red Shirt, Maj. Gen. Khattiya Sawasdipol, aka Seh Daeng, when the final anti-protest operation began.

More than 100 bank accounts have been frozen to prevent the flow of funds from exiled politicians to their Red Shirt proxies.

Parties affected by these moves go beyond Thaksin Shinawatra, the exiled former prime minister and inspiration behind the Red Shirts, who saw a large chunk of his remaining funds in Thai banks seized in late February (one proximate cause of the mass protests).

Nevertheless, the Red Shirt movement will eventually regroup, though perhaps under a different banner.

The movement is grounded in the wide disparity of wealth, power and status between Thailand’s northern and northeastern provinces and Bangkok.

percent of Thailand’s nearly 70 million population lives in Bangkok, while about one-third lives in the northeast.

movement thus will continue to enjoy an advantage in numbers and voters and will continue to clamor for a more representative government. Such political change would threaten the interests of members of the royal family and bureaucratic and military elites in Bangkok. The contest will continue to play out as elite factions opposed to the status quo harness the popular movement for their own gain.

The Red Shirts’ push to force new elections, which began in mid-March, has failed. Because the Reds did not agree with an earlier proposal to end protests in exchange for elections in November, the ruling Democrat Party does not need to call elections until December 2011.

This gives the ruling party time to work on keeping its coalition together, dismantle the Red Shirt movement, pursue its political enemies, consolidate power, finalize its budget with the necessary perks for its allies and defend itself against the acrimonious aftermath in parliament and against public charges of mishandling the affair — all of which it must accomplish if it is to survive.

One example of the hurdles it faces is the case under consideration by the Electoral Commission over whether to dissolve the Democrat Party due to corruption. If it loses the case, the party would have to re-form under a different name to stay in power.

For its part, the Thai army has greatly strengthened its position.

First, it has shut down the protests forcefully in the past week, reclaiming some of the prestige it lost after a bungled attempt to end protests April 10.

More important, with its preferred civilian leaders in place, the army can expect a smooth transition of leadership in October, when Gen. Prayuth Chan Ocha is expected to succeed current army chief Gen. Anupong Paochinda. Prayuth is seen as a staunch royalist and the head of the leading military faction, as opposed to the military faction sympathetic to the Red Shirts and to Thaksin.

Throughout the recent mayhem, and especially since mid-April, the military has taken a leading role in overseeing the security response to the protests — in great part accounting for the high levels of bloodshed.

This informal power will not be as conspicuous now that the protests have concluded, but the military is not eager to cede any influence it has gained.

In general, its influence in the Thai establishment is strengthening as other important institutions — namely the monarchy and Privy Council — are undergoing generational transitions.

To deflect any criticism that could undermine its newly strengthened position, the army can point to civilian leaders’ handling of the crisis.

Ultimately the conclusion of the latest bout of mass protests has reaffirmed the cycle of instability that is inseparable from Thailand’s geographical, social, political and economic conditions.

This cycle is accelerating and intensifying as King Bhumibol Adulyadej nears the end of his life and a half-century long reign, creating deep uncertainty and competition among powerful interests and institutions.

Thailand’s cyclical political troubles, and its frequent periods of rising military control, have not prevented it from achieving economic success over the past half century, and its deeply divided political forces have managed to find accommodation within its well-established governmental structures before.

But the death of the king threatens to weaken the country’s ideological cohesion in a way that has not happened since 1946, when his reign began, and therefore the trend toward greater political turbulence is set to increase over the coming years, at least until the transition takes place and a new power arrangement emerges.

This report is republished with the permission of STRATFOR: www.STRATFOR.com.

ENDS

Junta forced to back down in face of overwhelming alliance of ethnic armies

Mizzima

Dan Pedersen

May 9, 2010

An ethnic opposition leader says Burma’s ruling military junta, the State Peace and Development Council, has had to rethink its offensive against a northern alliance of ethnic armies.

After weeks of bristling at the borders of Kachin, Wa and Shan states, SPDC troops have withdrawn to barracks at Lashio, said Lahu Democratic Front chairman Aik Long.

He said SPDC troops, as they pulled out on May 4, shouted abuse at ethnic army sentries watching them go, saying they would return after the elections to “destroy them”.

Mr Long said five units of SPDC troops, numbering 16,500 men, had withdrawn from forward positions in northern Burma that had them pitched against the Wa, and harassing the cities of Mong La and Pang Sang.

Mr Long was in Pang Sang when the SPDC marched on the city.

“They couldn’t take the city, or Mong La, and have withdrawn to Lashio,” he said.

“But they said they would be back after the elections to fight harder and destroy us.”

Mr Long is a former general-secretary of the National Democratic Front, an ethnic alliance currently headed by Karen National Union vice president David Thackrabaw.

He said SPDC troops engaged the United Wa State Army on April 28 and fought until May 3 “with many hundreds dead”, but withdrew on May 4, returning to their Lashio base.

“They went home,” he said, laughing.

Mr Long said at Mong La, the SPDC had encountered a force of 60,000 ethnic soldiers, headed by the Wa, but including Shan, Lahu and Akha ethnic fighters.

In Pang Sang he said the SPDC had once again withdrawn, encountering an opposing force of about 40,000 soldiers, made up of Wa and Lahu fighters and smaller ethnic groups.

He acknowledged the numbers of ethnic fighters he referred to were significantly greater than numbers previously quoted in news reports – the Wa is generally quoted as having 30,000 men under arms – but he said there had been a rush of civilians looking to join the opposition alliance as fighters.

“Civilian rule is the only way forwards for the country now, and civilians are joining the ethnic armies to ensure this happens.

“There will only be more people joining [the army] as the situation intensifies,” said Mr Long.

The withdrawal by the SPDC must be considered a win for the new northern ethnic alliance that has formed in Burma, consisting of the Wa, Shan, Akha, Lahu and Lisu peoples.

Mr Long said there were also many smaller ethnic minorities that had melded into the alliance.

He said the SPDC would be smarting from its recent failed engagement, having realised it would have to return in greater numbers to exert any control over the major northern cities.

He said the fuel bill for the offensive also would have been costly – transporting more than 16,000 soldiers anywhere requires a lot of diesel.

Mr Long said security was incredibly tight in the north, with the UWSA having taken control of mobile telephony throughout the state.

All caller IDs on all mobile calls are blocked and Wa intelligence are listening 24 hours a day for signs of traitors or to identify SPDC intelligence officers, he said.

At the suggestion the UWSA generally maintained a high level of security because of illicit businesses it was involved, including the drug trade, Mr Long was hardly apologetic.

“It’s a small land, but big money [can be had].

“At the moment the SPDC is brutal and we need an army to protect ourselves – an army needs weapons, ammunition and wages,” he said, in defence of the Wa’s drug trade.

“What we really want is peace,” he said.

“This election the SPDC is proposing is a fake election, it’s not fair and square,” said Mr Long.

“If the SPDC really wants peace then the only way forwards is to first release all of the political prisoners – our leaders.

“But Than Shwe is bent on having a small, centralised area running the whole country and that is wrong,” he said.

ENDS

Mizzima

Dan Pedersen

May 9, 2010

More than 2,000 Democratic Karen Buddhist Army soldiers are said to have defected to the Karen National Union, after military field reports early this week had hundreds of the defectors fighting Burmese Army units as they made their towards the Thai border.

DKBA and KNU representative met on Friday morning to discuss this burgeoning alliance of foot soldiers. Present was Lahu Democratic Front chairman Aik Long Kham Mwe, who said more would join the more than 2,000 DKBA soldiers who had defected to the KNU in recent weeks.

But Chit Thu, the hard-line commander of the DKBA’s Brigade 999, who has made peace with the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) and become very rich in the process, still had a hard core of troops around him, Mr Long said. He said Brigade 999 was the militia’s only unit still attacking the KNU.

But for the DKBA rank and file, Chit Thu’s recent three-day public unveiling of his 10-bedroom villa that resembles a Las Vegas hotel might have represented the end of the road for many of them, Mr Long suggested.

There is little doubt Chit Thu is much better off financially than when he fought with the KNU. While his fleet of luxury vehicles grows, DKBA troops live in rudimentary bamboo shelters and eat bamboo shoots with chillies, rice and fish paste. Most of them do not own a single vehicle.

“For years the SPDC has had the Karen killing each other, now it looks like things might swing around,” Mr Long said. “Both the DKBA and KNU were at the meeting I attended this morning (Friday) and they all have the same idea now – to separate from the SPDC.”

“The KNU wants all Karen united, they don’t want to see the SPDC using the DKBA as human shields by pushing them into the front line by themselves,” he said. “Now is the time we must unite,” he said.

Brigade 999 reaps tax revenue from border crossings near Mae Sot, which it shares with KNU/KNLA Peace Council commander Tay Lay Mya, the youngest son of the late KNU powerbroker General Bo Mya.

Revenue from the Thai-Burmese Friendship Bridge across the Moei River is said to contribute about one billion baht a month to the Thai GDP. Bangkok has already approved a second bridge to be built to join Kokko on the Thai side and Shwe Kokko on the Burmese side and it is only a matter of time before construction begins.

The Tak chamber of commerce has for years lobbied to have such a link and new four-lane highways lead to the sleepy farming outpost of Kokko, cutting their way through the middle of Mae Sot. It is no wonder some locals no longer refer to Kokko by its original Thai name. Some just call it “Chit Thu”.

ENDS

Kokko bridge

Wangpha casino & resort, Shwe Kokko

VOA

May 8, 2010

Leading members of Burma’s main opposition party, who disagree with its boycott of an upcoming military-run election, say they are forming a breakaway faction to compete in the polls.

NLD member Than Nyien told VOA’s Burmese service Thursday that he and other members have decided to form a new political party called the National Democratic Force. He says the NDF will register with Burma’s military rulers to take part in the election to be held later this year.

Than Nyien says the political platform of the NDF will not be much different than that of the NLD, which is boycotting the election because it refuses to accept military terms in order to remain a legal party.

Under new election laws passed by Burma’s military, the NLD had to expel political prisoners from its ranks and register for the election by Thursday or face dissolution.

There was no immediate comment from the NLD on the breakaway faction’s decision to form a new party.

The NLD decided not to register for the election because doing so would have required it to expel its detained leader Aung San Suu Kyi. NLD members say their headquarters in Rangoon will continue to engage in humanitarian work but will no longer be involved in politics.

Some NLD members rolled up portraits of Aung San Suu Kyi at the headquarters Thursday before closing the office for the day.

Earlier, NLD spokesman Nyan Win told reporters in Rangoon that Burma’s Supreme Court refused to hear an NLD petition seeking to overturn the military’s new election laws.

Aung San Suu Kyi was convicted last August of violating the terms of her house arrest for sheltering an American who swam to her lakeside Rangoon home uninvited. The NLD leader and Nobel Peace laureate has spent 14 of the last 20 years under some form of detention.

Her party won the last democratically held election in 1990, but the military refused to accept the results.

ENDS